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ABSTRACT
Although the tendency of American corporations to decrease
rates of research and development (R&D) investment in recent years
has been noted by academic commentators, government officials, and
the popular press, far less attention has been focused on the underly-
ing causes for this underinvestment. Some blame hasbeen laid at the
feet of shortsighted shareholders who demand short term profits at the
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expense of long-term investments, and on the wave of corporate
restructurings of the 1980s said to be motivated by such short-term
thinking. This article, however, looks at the theory and data of corpo-
rate R&D spending, and determines that the "myopic investor" model
is seriously flawed. An alternative explanation for corporate under-
investment in R&D is proposed, based on the divergence of interests
between shareholders and managers, or "agency costs." This agency
cost model suggests that while shareholders-at least fully diversified
shareholders-prefer a high level of R&D investment, such investment
is not in the best interests of corporate managers. The agency cost
model is supported, and the "myopic investor" model refuted, by the
empirical data discussed in the article. The choice of a model ex-
plaining corporate underinvestment in R&D is, of course, more than
an academic question. An accurate model must form the basis for any
effective governmental efforts aimed at increasing private R&D
spending. The article looks at corporate restructuring as an example
of the importance of the predictive ability of models. If the "myopic
investor" model is correct, then corporate restructurings will harm
R&D spending, and should be discouraged by measures such as anti-
takeover legislation. If, however, agency costs are to blame, then
restructurings, which tend to reduce agency costs by displacing en-
trenched managers, ought not to be discouraged.
INTRODUCTION
In his influential and insightful commentary, Dean Robert Clark
described the evolution of the American capitalism over the last two
hundred years as comprising four distinct stages driven by the in-
creased specialization of the providers of capital: the age of entrepre-
neurs (or "robber barons," depending on one's perspective),' the age
of professional managers,' the age of portfolio managers,3 and the age
1. Robert Charles Clark, The Four Stages of Capitalism: Reflections on Investment Man-
agement Treatises, 94 HARv. L. Pv. 561,562 (1981). The first stage-the age of the entrepre-
neur-was characterized by that creature of nineteenth-century economic theory and
jurisprudence known as the "classical corporation." The classical corporation was a purely pri-
vate enterprise, organized and operated for the purely profit-seeking purposes of its owners. For
a discussion of the origins of the theory of the classical corporation, see generally, HERBERT
HOVENKAmP, ENERPlRise AND AMmCAN LAW, 1836-1937 (1991). Classical corporations were
characterized by their unity of entreprenuerialism, ownership, and management. Geoffrey P.
Miller, The Rise and Fall of the Classical Corporation, 59 U. CHi. L. Rav. 1677, 1681 (1992)
(reviewing Professor Hoven]kamp's book).
2. Clark, supra note 1, at 563. As business enterprises grew in the beginning of the
twentieth century, they required ever-increasing amounts of capital-more, even, than the
wealthy owners of firms could provide. Thus, the second stage was characterized by the publicly
held corporation, which divided the role played by entrepreneurs in the first stage into an owner-
ship function and a professional management function. Id.
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of the savings planner (or, in the phraseology of this article, the in-
dexed investor).4 A similar transformation has been observed in cor-
porate governance, fueled by the tension between shareholders and
managers. This transformation is characterized by the transition, still
underway, from shareholder primacy, to periods of managerial capital-
ism, monitored management, insulated mangerialism, and ultimately,
to long-term shareholders.' This article focuses on the nexus of these
transformations in capitalism and corporate governance and how they
have affected the level of corporate investment in research and devel-
opment (R&D). More specifically, this article examines the divergent
and evolving interests of shareholders and managers in R&D invest-
ment and seeks to explain why American corporations appear to invest
less in R&D than shareholders (or citizens) might prefer.
The value of corporate R&D spending, both for the investing
firm6 and for society, 7 is beyond dispute. However, most commenta-
tors .agree that American firms underinvest in R&D, relative to our
international competitors. 8 Several explanations have been offered for
this relative underinvestment, such as the high cost of capital in the
United States caused, at least in part, by the differential tax treatment
3. Id. at 564. By the mid-twentieth century, the control of capital had largely shifted from
wealthy households to financial institutions. In the third stage, the ownership function was di-
vided again, this time between capital-supplying and investing. Those supplying the capital are
shareholders, and those making the investment (or at least, making the investing decisions) are
professional portfolio managers. Id.
4. Id. at 565. The fourth stage, which in 1981 was "barely discernible in its infancy," is
in full flower in 1994. This stage, fueled by the rapid growth of public and private pension funds
and diversified mutual funds, is characterized by indexed and quasi-indexed investment, necessi-
tated by the huge sums of money under management. Ironically, to a great extent, the decision
of how to invest is eliminated in the fourth stage, replaced by the decision of whether to invest.
Id. at 565-67. This is why the savings planner is really an indexed investor.
As Dean Clark notes, there is considerable overlap among the stages, and all four stages
may be represented in the economy at any given time. Id. at 562.
5. John H. Matheson & Brent A. Olson, Corporate Law and the Longterm Shareholder
Model of Corporate Governance, 76 MiNtr. L. REv. 1313, 1324-26 (1992).
6. See, e.g., Anthony J. Parisi, How R&D Spending Pays Off, Bus. WK.: INNOvATION
1989, 177, 178 (Special Issue, 1990) (reporting the results of a study demonstrating that compa-
nies with the strongest performance in their markets are also those that spend the most, relative
to their size, on R&D).
7. See, e.g., Michael J. Boskin & Lawrence J. Lau, Capital, Technology, and Economic
Growth, in TEcHNoLOY AND THE WEALTH oF N rmoS 17, 51 (Nathan Rosenberg, Ralph Lan-
dau, David C. Mowery, eds. 1992)(identifying technical progress as "the most important source
of economic growth"); Henry T.C. Hu, Risk, Time, and Fiduciary Principals in Corporate In-
vestment, 38 U.C.L.A. L. Rv. 277, 306-07 n.77 (1990) ("investment in research and develop-
ment play an especially important role in economic growth"); Boyce Rensberger & Daniel
Southerland, National Science Board Warns U.S. Must Beef Up R&D, WASH. Posr, Aug. 13,
1992, at D10.
8. See, e.g, supra note 7.
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of debt and equity,9 and the fear of product liability lawsuits.10 Per-
haps the most popular explanation for corporate underinvestment in
R&D is premised on the existence of shareholder "myopia" or short-
sightedness. This myopia may take several forms. Shareholders, par-
ticularly the institutional investors who make up an increasing per-
centage of firm ownership, are "short-term" oriented, more interested
in this quarter's bottom line than in R&D investments that may take
years to pay off.1 Second, shareholders are disinclined towards
R&D, relative to other long term investments, such as plant and equip-
ment, because the returns are more difficult to appropriate.1 2
Shareholder or investor myopia, the popular argument follows,
induces management myopia. 3 Managers adopt the myopic perspec-
tive of their shareholders by underinvesting in R&D. This under-
investifient is due, at least in part, to managers' concern that poor
short-term returns will depress stock prices, upsetting shareholders,
and placing managerial positions at risk, either directly (through
boards of directors acting in response to shareholder dissatisfaction)14
9. See generally, B. Douglas Bemheim & J.B. Shoven, Comparing the Cost of Capital in
the United States and Japan, in TEcHNoLOoY AND Ta WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note 7, at
151; Ronald McKinnon & David Robinson, Dollar Devaluation, Interest Rate Volatility, and the
Duration of Investment in the United States, in TECHNOLOGY AND THE WEALTH OF NATIONS,
supra note 7, at 282, 310.
10. See, e.g., Peter Huber, Liability and Insurance Problems in the Commercialization of
New Products: A Perspective from the United States and England, in TEcHNoLOGY AND TE
WEALTH OF NATiONS, supra note 7, at 207 and sources cited therein.
11. See, e.g., McKinnon & Robinson, supra note 9, at 281-82 (noting shrinking time hori-
zons and preoccupation with short-term profits in American industry).
12. That is, the benefits, if any, that accrue from any given R&D investment may be shared
with other non-investing firms. For example, the video cassette recorder was invented at Ampex
Corporation, but this firm has seen little of the huge profits that VCRs have generated for other
firms. See America's Empire Strikes Back, ECONOMIsT, Feb. 22, 1992, at 51 ("The Japanese did
not invent the VCR-Ampex, a California firm, did so in 1961. Yet Matsushita, JVC, Sony,
Hitachi, Mitsubishi, Sharp and half a dozen others simply out-developed, out-produced, out-
marketed and finally out-lasted their American rivals."). See also John Holusha, The Risk for
High Tech, When Non-Techies Take Over, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 5, 1993, § 3, at 7 (noting that
Xerox Corporation's Palo Alto Research Center developed the computer mouse and user inter-
faces now in common use, but the benefits were reaped primarily by other companies such as
Apple and Microsoft).
13. See, e.g., Anjan V. Thakor, Investment "Myopia" and the Internal Organization of
Capital Allocation Decisions, 6 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 129, 130 (1990). Some commentators thus
refer to this explanation as "managerial myopia" rather than "investor myopia." See, e.g., Lisa K.
Meulbroek, et al., Shark Repellents and Managerial Myopia: An Empirical Test, 98 J. POL.
ECoN. 1108 (1990); Jeremy Stein, Takeover Threats and Managerial Myopia, 96 J. POL. EcON.
61 (1988). The two phrases refer to the same phenomenon.
14. Recent events at IBM, GM, American Express, and Westinghouse, among others,
make this threat more palpable than ever. But see Stuart Mieher, Weak Force: Shareholder
Activism, Despite Hoopla, Leaves Most CEOs Unscathed, WALL ST. J., May 24, 1993, at Al
(discounting the effects of shareholder activism at all but the largest corporations).
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or indirectly (through hostile takeover attempts.) 5 Short-term finan-
cial performance is improved by cutting R&D spending, since ac-
counting procedures require that R&D spending be expensed in the
period incurred, while the benefits of such spending may take years to
realize.' 6
The myopic market has considerable intuitive appeal as an expla-
nation for corporate underinvestment in R&D, but suffers a serious
drawback: it is not well-grounded in either theory or fact. This article
attacks the myopic market explanation and offers an alternative expla-
nation based upon agency costs.
Data indicates that shareholders are not, in fact, myopic when
R&D is concerned-indeed, they favor it. Share prices reflect not
only a firm's current earnings, but its future earnings potential dis-
counted to present value.' 7 Future earnings potential depends, to a
large extent upon a firm's R&D efforts."8 It will be argued here that
managers underinvest in R&D not to placate shareholder concerns but
rather in their own (or at least, their own perceived) self-interest.
Unlike a shareholder, whose utility is maximized by maximizing
share prices, a manager's utility is more dependent upon such factors
as job security 9 and her firm's latest quarterly results, factors that
mitigate against risky, long-term R&D investments.2" Shareholders
and managers thus have divergent interests with respect to R&D in-
vestment.2 ' Such conflicting interests are characterized in the eco-
nomic and legal literature as agency costs-costs associated with
organizing business structures in the form of principal-agent
relationships.22
Of course, agency costs will attach to virtually any corporate ac-
tivity where shareholders delegate responsibility to others-directors,
managers, or employees-and there is a burgeoning literature offering
15. See, e.g., Stein, supra note 13.
16. See Paul E. Nix and Richard M. Peters, Accountingfor R&D Expenditures, REs. TECH.
MANAomrENT, Jan.-Feb. 1988, at 39.
17. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. Fiscm., THE ECONOMIC STRucrUm OF COR-
PORATE LAW 191 (1991).
18. See, e.g., Parisi, supra note 6, at 178.
19. See, e.g., Melvyn A. Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 COLtrM. L. REv.
1461, 1471-74 (1989). Professor Eisenberg refers to the conflicts between shareholder wealth
maximization and managerial job security as "positional conflicts." Id.
20. Geoffrey S. Rehnert, Note, The Executive Compensation Contract: Creating Incentives
to Reduce Agency Costs, 37 STAN. L. REv. 1147, 1157-59 (1985).
21. The problem may be more one of astigmatism (that is, a form of distorted perception)
than myopia (nearsightedness).
22. An agent is a person who by mutual assent acts on behalf of another and subject to the
other's control. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY, § 1 (1958). The person for whom the
agent acts is a principal. Id.
1994]
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agency cost analyses of various aspects of the corporate enterprise. 23
Agency costs in the corporate R&D context differ, however, from
other aspects of corporate life in several important respects. This arti-
cle examines agency costs in corporate R&D activities from a theoret-
ical perspective, discusses why these agency costs are structurally
different from other types of corporate agency costs, and explores how
an agency cost theory comports with the available empirical data.
Part I of this article presents some background material on corpo-
rate research and development. Part II sets forth the basic theoretical
background by describing the neoclassical agency theory model of the
firm and by developing a second-order agency cost model for corpo-
rate R&D investment decisions. Part III tests the basic premises of the
model by examining data concerning the relationships between firm
size and R&D investments and market reactions to R&D investments,
and then uses the model to study the relationship between corporate
restructuring and R&D spending. Throughout Part I, the emphasis is
on presenting empirical evidence to support theoretical assertions. Fi-
nally, this article concludes with a brief exploration of some of the
implications of the agency cost model for policymakers seeking to
address the R&D underinvestment problem.
The focus of the article is on large, publicly traded corporations
with significant R&D efforts. Such firms account for the vast majority
of private R&D spending. The theoretical framework discussed here
is most applicable to large firms and may not accurately describe
smaller firms with, for example, significant owner-management, con-
trolling interests, and venture capital financing.
I. CORPORATE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
This part of the article provides background information for the
subsequent discussion of agency costs and corporate R&D by discuss-
ing what R&D is, why firms spend money on it, how firms got into
the business of organized R&D, the role of corporations in overall
23. See, e.g., PRINCIPALS AND Acm, s: THE STRucTuRE OF BUSINESS (John W. Pratt and
Richard J. Zeckhauser, eds., 1985); Victor Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and
the Rhetoric of Contract, 85 CoLUM. L. REv. 1403 (1985); William J. Carney, Controlling Man-
agement Opportunism in the Market for Corporate Control: An Agency Cost Model, 1988 Wise.
L. REv. 385; Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L.
REv. 1416 (1989); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Close Corporations and Agency
Costs, 38 STAN. L. REv. 271 (1986); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate
Control Transactions, 91 YALE LJ. 698 (1982); Hideki Kanda & Saul Levmore, Taxes, Agency
Costs, and the Price ofIncorporation, 77 VA. L. REv. 211 (1991); Rehnert, supra note 20. See
also sources cited in note 62, infra.
[Vol. 10
19941 R & D SPENDING
American R&D, and recent concerns over the level of corporate R&D
investment.
Research and development has several characteristics that are rel-
evant to the discussion below. It is an inherently risky, complex, ex-
pensive,' and time-consuming activity.' Research is said to come in
two forms: basic and applied. Basic research is "investigation to gain
knowledge for its own sake."26 Applied research is "investigation di-
rected towards gaining knowledge with specific commercial implica-
tions."'27 Development is the "translation of technical and scientific
knowledge into concrete new products and processes .. . [, the]
lengthy sequence of detail-oriented activities, including trial-and-er-
ror testing, through which the original concept is modified and per-
fected until it is ready for commercial utilization."2
The primary reason that corporations invest in R&D is, or at least
should be, to increase shareholder wealth.29 R&D is expected to pro-
vide the corporation with improved processes and new and improved
products.3 0 A 1977 survey of 600 companies, for example, indicated
that 59% of corporate R&D was directed toward improving existing
24. The costs associated with some types of innovations can be astronomical. Biotechnol-
ogy is one example. In part because the underlying technology is inherently expensive and in
part due to the high degree of regulatory oversight, the cost of introducing a single new biotech-
nology drug into the market has been estimated to range from $230 to $350 million. See William
Neikirk, Wonders of Technology Could Boost Economy, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 25, 1993, at 1. Semi-
conductors are another extraordinarily expensive technology to innovate, despite the lack of vir-
tually any regulation. For example, Intel's 80486 microprocessor took 100 engineers three years
to design at a cost of $250 million. See Don Clark, How LSI Gets High-Tech Edge, S.F. CHRON.,
Dec. 10, 1990, at Cl.
25. There can be a considerable lag, often many years, between the time of investment and
any payoff. Again, biotechnology provides a striking example. It can take 10 years for the FDA
to complete its review and approval process. Neikirk, supra note 24. Simply getting a patent is
typically a multi-year proposition. For example, a recent LEXIS search revealed that Motorola
filed 302 patent applications in 1985 that were approved by the Patent Office as of March, 1993
(the company and year were picked at random). The mean time for patent approval was 2.4
years and several patents took over 5 years for approval. These numbers are typical. Of the
104,000 patent applications filed in the United States in 1980, 65,000 were granted by the end of
1984, 1,400 more by the end of 1988, and 300 or so were expected to follow over the next 3-5
years. Zvi Grilliches, Patent Statistics as Economic Indicators, 28 J. EcON. Lrr. 1661, 1663
(1990).
26. F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIALx MARKET STRucruRE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 410
(2d ed. 1980)[hereinafter, ScHERmR, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRucruRE].
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See F.M. ScHERER, INNOVATION AND GRowTH 286 (1984)[hereinafter, ScHERtER, INNO-
VATION AND GRoWTH]("Company-financed R&D is without a doubt a profit-seeking activity.").
30. For a given firm size, there is a close correlation between the rate of research and
development spending and the total number of important inventions. Morton I. Kamien &
Nancy L. Schwartz, Market Structure and Innovation: A Survey, J. EcoN. Lrr., Mar. 1975, at 1,
5.
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products, 28% toward development of new products, and 13% toward
developing new manufacturing processes.31 Improved processes and
new and improved products enable corporations to realize reduced
costs, improved quality,32 and increased market share.
Corporate investment in R&D, then, is expected to generate as-
sets for the corporation in the form of ideas, inventions and innova-
tions. These assets become an important form of property for the
investing firm. Perhaps the most important characteristics of ideas
and information as corporate property are their "free good" and "pub-
lic good" attributes. An idea can be used and enjoyed by many people
at any given time without depriving other people of use or enjoyment
of the idea, and thus have the attributes of an inexhaustible resource,
or, in economic terms, a "free good." 3  At the same time, it is difficult
to prevent others from using an idea once it has been divulged and
thus, like clean air or national defense, ideas have the attributes of a
"public good."34 Therefore, ideas may be utilized by "free riders"
who did not share in the cost of producing the information. 35 The fact
that competing firms may benefit from a sponsoring firm's R&D in-
vestment is referred to as a "spillover" effect,36 or as imperfect or
weak appropriability. 37
Private corporations play a large and increasing role in overall
American R&D activities. For decades, it was the federal government
that financed the lion's share of R&D. But, by 1980, private R&D
31. ScrEm, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRucTUR, supra note 26, at 409 n.9 (citing What 600
Companies Spend for Research, Bus. WK., June 27, 1977, at 63).
32. See Ian Ayres, How Cartels Punish: A Structural Theory of Self-Enforcing Collusion,
87 COLuM. L. REV. 295, 307 n.57 (1987) ("Investments in research and development might be
modeled as either increasing the quality of a firm's product or as decreasing a firm's costs.").
33. See JAY DRATLER, JR., bNrm±EcTuAL PROPERTY LAW: COMMERCIAL, CREATIVE, AND
INDUSTRIAL PRoPEaRY § 1.01 (1991).
34. See Scirmnm, INNOVATION Am GROWrH, supra note 29, at 38 (noting that "the con-
sensus among economists would probably be that inventions are better characterized as public
goods rather than private goods"). See also Alfonso Ganbardella, Competitive Advantages from
In-House Scientific Research: The U.S. Pharmaceutical Industry in the 1980s, 21 Ras. Po L'v
391 (1992) (noting that science exhibits "public goods" attributes); Richard R. Nelson, What is
"Commercial" and What is "Public", in TEcNoL.oGY AND THE WEALTH OF NATIoNs, supra
note 7 at 57, 61 (referring to technology as a "latent public good.").
35. Interestingly (and predictably), however, firms with significant internal R&D efforts
are best able to capitalize on the innovations produced. See Gambardella, supra note 34, at 404.
36. See Thomas M. Jorde & David J. Teece, Innovation, Cooperation and Antitrust, 4
HMH TECH. LJ. 1, 6 n.6 (1989); Ayres, supra note 32. at 307 n.57 (1987) ('To the extent that
other firms benefit from the newly discovered information of their rivals, there may be supply-
side spillover effects from research and development. The spillover effect in general will result
whenever a firm's actions result in public goods upon which its free-riding competitors can
benefit.").
37. See Jorde & Teece, supra note 36, at 6.
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spending had surpassed government spending.38 In 1988, for exam-
ple, 53.5% of all United States R&D spending was accounted for by
the private sector.39 And in 1989, American industry spent $71.77
billion on R&D, compared to $68.72 billion from all other sources,
including the federal government. 4
The increasing relative contributions of corporations to overall
R&D spending raises several concerns. First, American corporations
are underinvesting in R&D, especially in comparison with our interna-
tional competitors, and this underinvestment appears to be worsen-
ing.41 American R&D spending as a percentage of Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) hovered at about 1.5% from 1971 to 1980 and rose
slowly to about 2.0% by 1989.42 Meanwhile, Germany and Japan
each spent approximately 2.0% of GDP on R&D in 1971 and this
figure steadily rose to nearly 3.0% by 1989. 41
Perhaps even more alarming than the statistics that show disap-
pointing relative rates of investment are some recent reports of abso-
lute numbers. One recent study has predicted decreased R&D
spending by private industry in 1993, particularly with regard to such
critical items as new hires, capital spending, and basic research, 4
while another indicates that, in inflation adjusted dollars, total United
States industrial R&D spending peaked in 1989, dropped slightly in
1990, and was projected to fall further in 1992.41 Several of
38. William J. Broad, Japan Seen Passing U.S. in Research by Industry, N.Y. TimFs, Feb.
25, 1992, at C1 [hereinafter Japan Seen Passing U.S.]. Government spending on research and
development takes the form of funding for federal laboratories, universities and colleges, and
non-profit institutions, as well as federally financed R&D at for-profit firms. The latter is pri-
marily for goods and services supplied to DOD, NASA, Department of Energy, etc. See
SCHERER, INruSmAL MARKET STmucru, supra note 26, at 409.
39. MICHAEL E. PORTER, THE COMPErrVE ADVANFAGE OF NATIONs 633 tbl. 12-1 (1990).
40. Japan Seen Passing U.S., supra note 38, at Cl.
41. See e.g., Steven Greenhouse, Attention America! Snap Out of It!, N.Y. TiMES, Feb. 9,
1992, § 3, at 1.
42. lit (graphically displaying American, Japanese, and German research and development
spending as a percentage of GDP for the last 20 years). See also PORTER, supra note 39, at 693
tbl. 13-1 (displaying similar data for the years 1975 to 1987 in tabular format). Overall Ameri-
can spending on R&D including defense as a percent of GDP lags that in Japan, Germany, and
Sweden. Id. at 521.
43. Greenhouse, supra note 41, § 3, at 1.
44. William J. Broad, Companies Cut Research Budgets, N.Y. TimEs, Nov. 11, 1992, at
A21 (reporting on survey by the Industrial Research Institute).
45. See William J. Broad, Ridden with Debt, U.S. Companies Cut Funds for Research,
N.Y. TimlEs, June 30, 1992, at CI (reporting findings of the National Science Founda-
tion)[hereinafter, Ridden with Debt]. In fact, the numbers may be even worse, since the reported
figures for United States R&D spending include amounts spent by foreign firms doing research
in the United States. Such research has grown dramatically in recent years, accounting for 6% of
the total in 1980 and for 13% of the total figure in 1989. Id. Moreover, adjusting for inflation
may underestimate the extent of the decline in corporate investment in R&D. There is evidence
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America's largest industrial corporations have announced or are ex-
pected to announce huge reductions in R&D spending.46 And it ap-
pears that Japan, a country with a significantly smaller GDP than the
United States, now spends more in absolute terms on industrial
R&D.47
that the GDP deflator, typically used to adjust R&D spending for inflation, may significantly
underestimate the rate of R&D inflation. See Edwin Mansfield et al., R&D Price Indexes and
Real R&D Expenditures in the United States, 12 Rns. POL'Y 105 (1983). Mansfield, et al. claim
that this inflation differential accounted for the bulk of the apparent increase in R&D spending
during the 1969-1979 period. Id. at 112. See also Holusha, supra note 12 (describing the "R&D
Plateau"-flat or decreased R&D spending in inflation adjusted dollars by corporations and the
federal government since 1987).
46. See, e.g., Michael Schrage, Innovation: R&D Realignment, L.A. TMmEs, Nov. 19, 1992,
at D1 (predicting that General Motors will reduce R&D spending by $1 billion per year, or 25%
within 3 years, and IBM will reduce R&D spending by $500 million per year, or 12.5% within 4
years). The R&D picture at IBM appears to be worsening rapidly. See Josh Hyat, IBM to Cut
25,000 Jobs, Pay Out $6B, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 16, 1992, at I (reporting that IBM planned to
cut $1 billion in R&D spending). Then-President-Elect Clinton reacted to this news, comment-
ing that R&D spending was "the exact thing that we don't want them to be cutting." Id. The
impact of these reductions on overall R&D spending is very significant. General Motors and
IBM ranked number 1 and 2, respectively, in total R&D spending by United States finns in
1991. Robert Buderi, R&D Scoreboard: On a Clear Day You Can See Progress, Bus. WK., June
29, 1992, at 104, 105 [hereinafter 1991 R&D Scoreboard]. But see Steve Lohr, High-Tech
Goliaths, Taking Pains to Act Small, N.Y. Trmrs, Dec. 30, 1992 at DI (noting that R&D spend-
ing by smaller, but faster growing high-tech companies is compensating for spending cuts by
large corporations). The different behavior of small and large companies with respect to R&D
spending will be examined infra Part I.
47. Japan Seen Passing U.S., supra note 38. The United States government disagrees,
clalming that United States industry still spends more, though admits that its lead is diminishing.
Id. It is undisputed that large Japanese firms have dominated the lists of top corporate grantees
of United States patents in recent years, as indicated in the following chart:
Top 10 Corporations Ranked By Number Of
U.S. Patents Granted
For Selected Years Between 1973 and 1993
(U.S. Corporations in Italic)
Rank 1993 1991 1989 1987 1984 1973
1 IBM Toshiba Hitachi Canon Hitachi GE
2 Toshiba Mitsubishi Toshiba Hitachi Toshiba GM
3 Canon Hitachi Canon Toshiba Canon IBM
4 Kodak Kodak Fuji GE Mitsubishi Westinghouse
5 GE Canon GE Philips GE Kodak
6 Mitsubishi GE Mitsubishi Westinghouse Fuji Du Pont
7 Hitachi Fuji Philips IBM Kodak Bell Labs
8 Motorola IBM Siemens Siemens Philips Philips
9 Matsushita Philips IBM Mitsubishi IBM Dow Chemical
10 Fuji Motorola Kodak RCA Siemens Siemens
Sabra Chartrand, U.S. Gains on Japan in Patents, N.Y. Tia, March 14, 1994 at CI (reporting
on 1993 statistics); Kodak Receives Most of the Nation's Patents Among U.S. Companies, UPI
BC Cyc, EMarch 30, 1992 (reporting on 1991 statistics); Top Corporate Patent Getters Shift
Positions, 19 INsroE R&D 7 (Sept. 12, 1990)(reporting on 1989 and 1987 statistics); Josephine
Marcotty, U.S. Getting Territorial About Patents; Lawsuits Aim to Protect Technology, STAR
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The shift from government-financed to privately-financed R&D
raises concerns for basic research. Private industry spending on R&D
is heavily oriented towards the development end of the spectrum. In
1975, for example, basic research accounted for 3%, applied research
for 19%, and development for 78% of all industrial R&D outlays.
48
However, while the contributions of corporations towards overall
R&D spending is most heavily felt in the development area, it is by no
means insignificant in basic or applied research. "Private industry ac-
counts for approximately 17% of all basic research conducted in the
United States, 55% of all applied research, and 85% of all develop-
ment."49 Of particular concern is the fact that the percentage of the
private R&D dollars spent on basic research or "breakthrough-ori-
ented R&D" is declining.50
The relative contributions of corporations for overall R&D
spending is likely to increase in the coming years. Government
spending on R&D is heavily oriented toward defense (68% in 1988),51
and even that has not kept up with inflation.52 Continuing fiscal pres-
sure on the federal government combined with decreasing emphasis
on defense spending will likely decrease federal research spending in
absolute terms53 and increase the R&D spending of corporations rela-
TRIB., Sept. 9, 1991 at D1 (reporting on the 1984 statistics); Carl S. Kaplan, Is U.S. Falling
Behind or is World Catching Up? Foreigners Take Nearly Half of New Patents, NEwSDAY, July
23, 1989 at 47 (reporting on the 1973 statistics). The difference between the 1973 figures, when
eight of the top ten corporate patentees were United States corporations, and the 1984 through
1993 figures, when no more than four of the top ten corporate patentees were United States
corporations, is striking. Similar results are reflected by changes in overall percentage of patents
granted foreign inventors, which has steadily risen from 35 percent in 1975 to 48 percent in
1988. Kaplan, supra. There is, however, some indication that Japanese firms may also be cut-
ting back on R&D in recent years. See, e.g., R&D Spending to be Flat at Major Japanese Firms,
L.A. TmEs, Mar. 4, 1992, at D2 (noting that Hitachi, Mitsubishi, and Nissan Motor had indi-
cated that 1992 R&D spending would remain at 1991 levels).
48. ScHrEnR, INDusTmAL MARKEr STRucrtups supra note 26, at 410.
49. Id.
50. See id. at 266 (noting that RCA and DuPont have announced sharp reductions in break-
through-oriented R&D). See also Neikirk, supra note 24 (noting that "U.S. industrial research
and development spending by corporations aimed at spurring new technology rose a meager 0.4
percent a year from 1985 to 1991, compared with 7.5 percent annually from 1980 to 1985,"
citing the National Science Board); Robert Buderi, A Tighter Focus for R&D, Bus. WK. (special
issue: Quality 1991) 169, 171 (noting that United States corporations have shifted their spending
focus "from the R to the D").
51. PORTER, supra note 39, at 633 tbl. 12-1.
52. Id.
53. The recent reduction in funding of the NASA space station and the defunding of the
superconducting supercollider in Texas are prominent examples of this decreasing emphasis.
See, e.g., High-Tech Dollars, WASH. PosT, Feb. 11, 1994, at All (noting the tightening federal
spending on basic research); Clifford Krauss, Deficit Taking Toll on Lawmaker's Dreams of Big-
Science Projects, N.Y. TIMEs, June 28, 1993, at A13.
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tive to government spending in the future.5 4
It is true that American high-technology industries are prospering
today. The United States, for example, exports in excess of $35 bil-
lion more per year in high technology products than it imports.55 But
R&D investments take a notoriously long time to pay off. Today's
high-technology trade surplus is a result of investments made in the
1970s and early 1980s, when the United States was the clear world
leader in R&D spending.56 Corporate investment decisions made to-
day will impact Americans' quality of life ten and twenty years down
the road.
II. AN AGENCY COST MODEL OF CORPORATE R&D SPENDING
A. An Agency Cost Model of the Firm
Part I, supra, discussed the nature of research and development,
how corporations became involved, and eventually came to dominate
research and development, and the fact that in recent years United
States firms increasingly seem to underinvest in research and develop-
ment. The remainder of this article examines corporate theory as an
explanation for this underinvestment. This part provides the initial
theoretical foundation by examining one model of the firm-the
agency cost model. This model will form the basis for the remaining
discussion of the theory and empirical data concerning firm-financed
R&D activities.
The classical model of the firm viewed the corporation as a mere
manifestation or extension of its owners.5 7 Because large firms re-
quired large amounts of capital, many "owners" were required for
each firm.58 Because it was impractical and inefficient for these own-
ers to make day-to-day operational decisions for the firm, the owners
(the "principals") delegated this responsibility to professional manag-
ers (the "agents"). 59 Despite this delegation of operational decision-
making, classical theory understood the firm to be controlled
54. This trend will put us more in line with our international competitors. For example, in
Japan in 1986 78.8% of research and development spending was accounted for by the private
sector and only 3.5% of government R&D spending was defense-related. In Germany in 1987,
the numbers were 59.1% and 12.5%, respectively. PORTER, supra note 39, at 633 tbl. 12-1.
55. Peter Passell, High-Tech Industry Is Hard to Help, N.Y. TIMFs, Feb. 2, 1993, at Cl.
56. See, e.g., Anthony Flint, Nobels Aside, Scholars See Perils for U.S. Research, BosToN
Gt.oaa, Oct. 15, 1993, at 1 (noting concern in academic community that Nobel prizes awarded
United States scientists in the 1990s are for work performed in the 1970s, when government
spending on R&D was more generous).
57. See note 1, supra.
58. See note 2, supra.
59. Id.
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collectively by active, interested, informed shareholders rather than by
managers.60 Berle and Means explored this model in the wake of the
stock market crash of 1929 in their extraordinarily influential work,
The Modern Corporation and Private Property.6 The Berle and
Means "neoclassical" model, expanded upon in recent years by com-
mentators such as Alchian, Demsetz, Fama, Jensen and Meckling,62
views the separation of ownership and control63 as the paradigmatic
characteristic of the modem large firm. Modem industrial firms re-
quire huge amounts of capital. This capital is collected from large
numbers of shareholders, each of whom typically holds only a minus-
cule percentage of the outstanding shares of the corporation.' 4 Own-
ership of the corporation is thus atomized (or at least severely
fragmented), and individual shareholders' votes and voices are dimin-
ished. Shareholders then hold their shares as passive investments
while the firm's management exercises effective control over the
corporation.65
Separation of ownership and control can, of course, be an effi-
cient organizational paradigm.66 The flourishing of large corporations
in the post Berle and Means period is testament to this efficiency. The
conducting of a firm's business through an agency relationship is not
60. See, e.g., Lynne L. Dallas, Two Models of Corporate Governance: Beyond Berle &
Means, 22 J. LAW REFoRm 19, 19-20 (1988).
61. ADOLPH A. BEua & GARDINER C. MEANs, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY (rev. ed. 1967).
62. See, e.g., Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and
Economic Organization, 62 AM. EcoN. Rav. 777 (1972); Michael C. Jensen & William H.
Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3
J. FIN. EcoN. 305 (1976); Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J.
POL. ECON. 288 (1980); Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and
Control, 26 J.L. & EcoN. 301 (1983).
63. It may be more accurate to state the paradigm as "separation of the decision and risk
bearing functions." See Fama & Jensen, supra note 62, at 301.
64. See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, Some Differences in Corporate Structure in Germany, Japan,
and the United States, 102 YALE L.J. 1927, 1933 (1993). Roe and others point out, however,
that the recent ascendancy of institutional investors is challenging the atomized, passive share-
holder paradigm. See generally, Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of
Institutional Investor Voice, 39 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 811 (1992)[hereinafter Agents Watching
Agents]; Bernard S. Black, The Value of Institutional Investor Monitoring: The Empirical Evi-
dence, 39 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 895 (1992)[hereinafter The Value of Institutional Investor
Monitoring].
65. See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FiscmHE, supra note 17, at 82.
66. See Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91 CoLUM. L.
REv. 1, 12 (1991); see also EASTERBROOK & FiscHEL, supra note 17, at 11:
The separation of risk bearing from employment is a form of the division of labor.
Those who have wealth can employ it productively even if they are not good
managers; those who can manage but lack wealth can hire capital in the market;
and the existence of claims that can be traded separately from employment allows
investors to diversify their investment interests.
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without its costs, however. The agency cost model of the firm focuses
on these costs, which arise from two primary principal-agent asymme-
tries: interest and information. 67
Agency theory assumes, much as economic theory generally
does, that everyone is motivated by self-interest-that is, that agents
and principals are welfare maximizers. 68  Asymmetries in interest
arise because shareholders and managers seek to maximize personal
utility in different ways: shareholders seek to maximize personal util-
ity through maximizing share market value 69 while management gen-
erally cannot maximize personal utility in this manner. Although
there may be some psychic benefit70 and even a market benefit 71 for
managers in maximizing firm market value, managers generally will
not maximize personal utility by maximizing share market value. This
is so because managers who own less than the entire firm cannot cap-
ture all of the benefits of their efforts to maximize share price and do
not suffer all of the cost of their failure to do so. 72
Information asymmetries arise because management and share-
holders have different information available to them. Managers do not
know exactly what shareholders would have them do in many situa-
tions, and shareholders do not know how managers in fact act. The
information asymmetry exacerbates the interest asymmetry and can
create a moral hazard:73 when manager-agents have complete discre-
tion and are not observed by the shareholder-principals, there will be
little incentive for managers not to maximize their own utility at the
expense of the shareholders. For example, managers might shirk their
responsibilities and increase their leisure time, use their effective con-
trol to give themselves excessive compensation, or to resist a takeover
that was attractive to the shareholders but which would divest manag-
ers of their power and perquisites.
67. See John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Principals and Agents: An Overview, in
PRINCIPALS A AGmNrs, supra note 23, at 1-24; Joseph E. Stiglitz, Principal and Agent, in
ALLocAION, INFORMATrON AND MARKS 241-53 (John Eatwell et al. eds. 1987).
68. See Morey W. McDaniel, Bondholders and Stockholders, 13 J. CORP. L. 205, 230
(1988).
69. See, e.g., Rehnert, supra note 20, at 1156.
70. See id. at 1157 (noting that some managers assert that personal pride in a job well done
is their primary motivation).
71. This refers to the market for the manager's services. It is implicit in the discussion
here that the manager is not a shareholder in the firm (and thus does not enjoy a market benefit
from increasing share market value) unless explicitly stated.
72. Rehnert, supra note 20, at 1157.
73. See Kenneth J. Arrow, The Economics of Agency, in PRINCIPALS AND Aoamrs, supra
note 23, at 37, 38 (referring to the moral hazard attaching to hidden action by agents); Iman
Anabtawi, Note, Toward a Definition of Insider Trading, 41 STAN. L. Rv. 377, 386 (1989)
(same).
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The traditional solution to the divergence of interests of principal
and agent is increased monitoring.74 This monitoring, though, has as-
sociated costs. Shareholders must either perform the monitoring
themselves (and thus suffer opportunity costs) or engage another agent
to perform the monitoring for them, incurring not only the compensa-
tion costs of the monitors but the agency costs inherent in that rela-
tionship as well.75 Engaging an agent to monitor for shareholders,
then, simply raises the question of who monitors the monitor.76
Moreover, self-monitoring by shareholders is itself problematic
when the ownership of the firm is atomized, as postulated by the Berle
and Means model. The costs of monitoring are borne by the share-
holder who performs the monitoring, but that shareholder cannot real-
ize all of the gains that accrue from such monitoring. She can merely
expect that percentage of the gains represented by her pro-rata owner-
ship of the firm, as any gains are shared by all shareholders. Thus,
absent a shareholder with sufficient holdings to justify the expenditure
of monitoring costs, monitoring is likely to be inadequate.
Incentives offer an alternative to monitoring for principals to cor-
rect for informational and interest asymmetries between principals and
agents. 77 While monitoring seeks to correct the informational asym-
metry, incentive structures seek to align the interests of principals and
agents.78
The most common means of using incentives to align the inter-
ests of management and ownership are through management share
ownership or through other profit sharing schemes based on stock or
individual performance.79 Under these schemes, managers' compen-
sation is based at least in part on share market value.80 This can be an
effective means of reducing agency costs, since not only are manage-
74. See EAsTmEROOK & FiscHEL, supra note 17, at 9-10.
75. Id. at 10.
76. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An
Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REv. 863, 873-74 (1991). Gilson & Kraakman
cite an excerpt from Dr. Suess describing the monitoring costs incurred when the town of
Hawtch-Hawtch engaged an agent to watch the town bee. The result: "And today all the
Hawtchers who live in Hawtch-Hawtch are watching on Wath-Watcher-Watcherering-Watch,
Watch-Watching the Watcher who's watching that bee." Id. at 874 n.38 (citing THEoDoRE GEas-
SEL (DR. Suess), DID I EvER Tw.L You How LucKY You ARE? 29 (1973)).
77. Rehnert, supra note 20, at 1166.
78. Stiglitz, supra note 67, at 242.
79. See, e.g., Rehnert, supra note 20 (discussing executive compensation contracts as an
agency cost reduction mechanism); Louis Rorimer, Put More Incentive In Incentive Pay, N.Y.
Tndms Jan. 16, 1994, § 3, at 11 (same). But see Eisenberg, supra note 19, at 1489-97 (expressing
skepticism at the efficacy of executive compensation schemes to significantly align shareholder
and management interests).
80. See supra note 79.
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ment's interests more aligned with those of shareholders, but they are
given incentive to monitor their fellow managers and other agents,"' a
job they could presumably perform more efficiently than could share-
holders. Such incentives are not without drawbacks, however: 1) in-
centives have their own associated costs by reducing the profits that
would otherwise inure to the shareholders; 82 2) incentive schemes are
imperfect in that they are susceptible to free-riding (such as the case of
stock performance schemes);83 and 3) incentives may induce subordi-
nation of team goals for individual indicators (in the case of individual
performance schemes).
Bonding is another alternative to monitoring for reducing agency
costs. Bonds are "automatic devices that impose penalties for a
shortfall in performance."84 An example is a requirement that manag-
ers hold significant stock positions in their firms, thereby linking their
personal wealth to the fortunes of the firm.85 Another bonding device
is the investment of firm-specific (i.e., undiversified) human capital on
the part of the agent.86 This refers to skills, training, and other knowl-
edge acquired by the agent at her cost that have a reduced value
outside the firm. 7
Another approach to reducing agency costs in firms are the vari-
ous corporate governance rules that have been proposed and adopted
by both legislatures and courts. These rules include prohibitions
against certain self-dealing transactions," requirements for outside di-
rectors,89 and limitations on executive compensation90 which are in-
81. EASTERBROOK & FzscHEL, supra note 17, at 9.
82. See generally, Richard A. Booth, The Other Side of the Management Compensation
Controversy, 22 SacuRrnas REG. L.J. 22 (1994). Hence the controversy over excessive grants of
stock options and other stock-based compensation to executives.
83. This is true even for relative market price schemes such as those discussed in Rehnert,
supra note 20, at 1168-80. It is not possible to attribute the movement (or some portion of the
movement) in the market value of a firm's securities, even when adjusted for overall market and
industry swings, to the efforts of a single, individual manager, unless the firm is a single-em-
ployee firm. See, e.g., EASmERBROOK & FiscHEL, supra note 17, at 9.
84. EA'sRmBROOK & Fiscnai., supra note 17, at 10.
85. Id.
86. See, e.g., Hu, supra note 7, at 319; Rehnert, supra note 20, at 1173.
87. See, e.g., EASTMROOK & FiscHEm, supra note 17, at 29-30; John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 MicH. L. REv. 1, 74-75
(1986); Rehnert, supra note 20, at 1173. A more precise definition of firm-specific human capi-
tal might be the difference between the manager's expected stream of future earnings within the
firm and her expected stream of future earnings outside the firm. Fama, supra note 62, at 297.
88. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 310 (restricting self-interested transactions of directors);
Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 503, 510-13 (Del. 1939)(imposing duty on corporate officers and directors
not to appropriate corporate opportunities).
89. See, e.g., William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Firn: Critical
Perspectives from History, 41 STAN. L. Rv. 1471, 1479 (1989).
90. See generally Rehnert, supra note 20.
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tended to curb those agency costs that are least responsive to market-
based mechanisms such as monitoring and bonding, and thus most in
need of government regulation.
Of course, no amount of monitoring, bonding, and regulation will
completely eliminate agency costs-there will always be what Jensen
and Meckling refer to as residual costs. 91 Furthermore, as Jensen and
Meckling point out, the cost of the agency relationship is minimized
not by minimizing the residual cost, but rather by minimizing the sum
of monitoring costs, bonding costs, and residual costs.92
In an idealized (i.e., interest-aligned) model of the firm, manage-
ment merely makes the day-to-day profit-maximizing decisions that
owners would make had they not delegated that authority to their
agents.9 3 Even this idealized firm is not without agency costs, how-
ever, as management's compensation is a form of agency costs. 94 In
fact, all management costs may be characterized as agency costs of
one sort or another. Because firms and managements are organized in
hierarchies, agency costs can increase dramatically as firm size in-
creases.95 The agency cost model of the firm would predict that firm
size increase so long as the gains realized from increased economies
of scale are not more than offset by increased management costs and
other agency costs. 96
B. An Agency Cost Model of Corporate R&D
Before proceeding to apply agency cost concepts to corporate
R&D investment decisions, a threshold question must be addressed:
why is an agency cost model of corporate decisions regarding R&D
91. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 62, at 305. Residual cost is the reduction in the princi-
pal's welfare through the nonfeasance, misfeasance, and malfeasance of the agent. McDaniel,
supra note 68, at 231.
92. Id. See also EASTaanROOK & FiscHEL, supra note 17, at 10.
93. This assumes that managers are the perfectly dutiful and knowledgeable agents of the
shareholders.
94. Of course management costs may be more than offset by efficiency gains, particularly
in growing corporations. Nevertheless, these costs must be treated as real costs to the
shareholders.
95. Management hierarchies tend to increase more rapidly than overall firm size. See infra
note 208. For an analysis of how firm size can be management limited, see Oliver E. William-
son, Hierarchical Control and Optimum Firm Size, 75 J. Pot.. ECoN. 123 (1967).
96. Increased firm size can lead to increased economies of scale and increased efficiencies
due to specialization of labor. However, increased firm size can also lead to increased agency
costs. As discussed above, see supra note 95, management costs can be expected to increase
more than linearly with firm size. Increased efficiency, however, would most likely increase less
than linearly with firm size (this is the familiar diminishing returns effect). Thus, at some point,
the efficiency gains realized from a marginal increase in firm size can be expected to be more
than offset by the increase in agency costs. If firm profitability is maximized, the firm- will stop
growing at this point.
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appropriate? Agency cost models are, after all, typically used for non-
operational managerial decisions: corporate opportunities,97 executive
compensation,98 insider trading,99 etc. One does not ordinarily look
for agency cost models to explain corporate decisions concerning day-
to-day production matters-the market is thought to "correct" manag-
ers for making "wrong" decisions on most operational issues. As one
commentator has noted: "A skeptic might... ask why economists are
so ready to second-guess business on research and development
spending when they seem content to let the hidden hand of the market
determine the output of, say, corn flakes or drill bits."' "°°
The answer is that R&D is different from other corporate opera-
tions: as discussed above, the investments are more risky, long-term,
and difficult to appropriate the benefits from than many other invest-
ments, and technology is more difficult for lay managers and share-
holders to understand than many other aspects of corporate life.
Because the various participants in the corporate venture have differ-
ent interests with regard to investment risk, time-scale, and ap-
propriability, an agency cost model has the potential to provide
insight. This section sets out the structure of an agency cost model of
corporate R&D-that is, it will identify the divergent interests of
shareholders and managers. Some data (empirical and anecdotal) will
be used to establish what these interests are with respect to R&D in-
vestments.101 Following the presentation of this model, Part MI exam-
97. See, e.g., id. at 141-42.
98. See, e.g., Rehnert, supra note 20.
99. See, e.g., Dennis Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35
STAN. L. REv. 857, 866-72 (1983).
100. Passell, supra note 55.
101. A word on the empirical data: research and development economic measurements are
notoriously troublesome. See, e.g., Andrew G. Berg, Cost Efficiencies in the Section 7 Calculus:
A Review of the Doctrine, 37 CASE W. R.s. L. Rav. 218, 241 n.89. (citing P. AREEDA & D.
TuRNER, 4 AUrrmmusT LAw 189 (1968) for the proposition that the proof problems in research
and development economies "are truly formidable"). For one thing, it is very difficult to mea-
sure the effects of research and development-that is, R&D outputs-directly. Not only is it
difficult to measure outputs, there is not even general agreement on the appropriate inputs. For
example, it is very hard to isolate inputs on "research" or "inventing" alone, so it is common to
settle for measurements of "research and development" inputs.
There are several possible measures of research and development "intensity." Scherer, for
examples suggests R&D expenditures and R&D employees as inputs, patent counts, a count of
significant innovations, and estimates of sales associated with new products introduced as out-
puts. ScERn.R, NousRiAL MARKEr STRucru-E, supra note 26, at 418. See also Kamien &
Schwartz, supra note 30, at 4 (suggesting R&D spending, R&D employees, and scientists and
engineers employed as appropriate inputs, and patents awarded, important patents awarded, im-
portant inventions or innovations, and sales of new products as outputs). The easiest measures to
obtain are R&D expenditures (typically included on the balance sheets and SEC filings of indus-
trial corporations as a separate line item expense) and patent counts (determinable on LEXIS and
WESTLAW).
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ines the available empirical data with respect to the premises and
conclusions of the model.
1. The Parties and Their Maximands
a. Shareholders
Shareholders provide an absolutely critical component of pri-
vately funded research and development: the private funds. Share-
holders provide the initial capital, any necessary additional working
capital, and are the claimholders for any residual profits remaining
after the finn's expenses have been met.'02 Shareholders, however,
do not represent a monolithic group with undifferentiated interests
with regard to R&D investments. For the purposes of analyzing
shareholder interests in R&D investment, this article divides share-
holders into three groups: underdiversified (or undiversified) share-
holders, diversified shareholders, and indexed shareholders.
i. Underdiversified shareholders
Underdiversified shareholders are defined here as those share-
holders who hold an investment portfolio dominated by the shares of
one or a small number of firms. Such portfolios are "risky" invest-
ments, since the fortunes of the investor are closely linked to those of
a single firm. Typical examples of underdiversifed shareholders are
investors with controlling interests in firms or with a large proportion
of their investment portfolio devoted to a single firm. 103 Thus, the
truly undiversified investor (qua investor) maximizes personal utility
by maximizing the market value of that single firm. Note, however,
that few, if any, investors are truly undiversified,' 4 and most are more
diversified than they think."0 5 However, as will be discussed below,
there is one class of underdiversified investor that is very important to
the analysis here-firm management."0 6
102. Fama & Jensen, supra note 62, at 302-03.
103. The former tend to be underdiversified since their controlling interests will often con-
sume a large portion of the funds they have available for investment. The latter are underdiversi-
fled by definition.
104. For example, one in four American households invests in mutual funds. See Leslie
Wayne, Investment Soars in Mutual Funds, Causing Concerns, N.Y. Timss, Sept. 7, 1993, at Al.
105. See EASTMMROOK & Fiscm., supra note 17, at 122 (noting that in addition to equity
holdings, most shareholders also own homes, insurance policies, and interests in pension funds
among other assets, all of which ought to be considered for purposes of portfolio diversification).
106. Firm non-management employees also are typically underdiversified, but with respect
to interests in R&D investment, they can be treated as management for the purposes of this
discussion.
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ii. Diversified shareholders
Risk-averse shareholders seek a diversified portfolio of invest-
ments in order to reduce risk.107 For present purposes it is sufficient
to state that the greater the number of different securities held by an
investor, the less the risk.108 The precise number of securities re-
quired to have a "sufficiently" diversified portfolio is a subject of
some debate,"° but it appears that once a portfolio of individual secur-
ities reaches thirty or so stocks, the marginal rate of risk reduction
realized through increased diversification is offset by the marginal in-
crease in transaction costs of adding an additional stock to the portfo-
o.110 Thus, for the purposes of this article, diversified investors refer
to those investors whose portfolios are dominated by the securities of
10 to 30 firms.
Of course, the investors in any particular firm will each have dif-
ferent investment portfolios, and different preferences in terms of risk,
income, etc. If firm management is to act in the best interests of
shareholders and shareholders have different individual interests, how
is management to act? Fortunately, there is a simple answer: the inter-
ests of diversified shareholders are maximized when management
maximizes firm market value.1 1 This is so because individual share-
holders lend or borrow against the increase in stock market value to
realize their individual consumption or income preferences.11 2
iii. Indexed shareholders
Most portfolio theory analysis proceeds on the assumption that
stocks in an investor's portfolio are chosen randomly.1 13 However,
whether securities are chosen randomly or are individually selected, it
107. See, e.g., EAsTErEROOK & FiscHEL, supra note 17, at 119.
108. See, e.g., id. at 121.
109. Compare John L. Evans & Stephen H. Archer, Diversification and the Reduction of
Dispersion:An EmpiricalAnalysis, 23 J. FiN. 761,767 (1968) (questioning the economic justifi-
cation of increasing portfolio sizes beyond 10 or 12 securities) with Meir Statman, How Many
Stocks Make a Diversified Portfolio?, 22 J. FiN. & QuANT. ANAL. 353, 362 (1987) (concluding
that "a well-diversified portfolio must include, at the very least, 30 stocks . .
110. Statman, supra note 109, at 359.
111. See, e.g., EASMERROOK & Ftscim., supra note 17, at 35-39; Hu, supra note 7 at 288-
90; Rehnert, supra note 20, at 1156.
112. See Rehnert, supra note 20, at 1156.
113. See, e.g., Statman, supra note 109, at 358; Evans & Archer, supra note 109, at 762. Of
course, few investors truly pick their stocks randomly. Rather, they or their agents research
firms in order to select the stocks that in theory best meet the investment criteria of the individual
investor (in terms of growth potential, risk, income, etc.) when considered along with the other
stocks in the investor's portfolio. Thus, the assumption of random picking, of course, can dra-
matically understate the transaction costs involved in adding an additional security to the
portfolio.
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is clear that with a portfolio of ten to thirty securities it is impossible
to diversify both across industries (and thus reduce the risk of reduc-
tion of portfolio value due to the cyclical misfortunes of a particular
industry) and within industries (and thus reduce the risk of reduction
of portfolio value because of the misfortunes of a particular firm, even
though that firm's industry is thriving).
True diversification both across and within industries requires in-
dexing. Ideally, the indexed investor holds shares in all firms in the
market in proportion to each firm's market value. Of course, the
transaction costs of an individual investor compiling her own indexed
portfolio would be extraordinarily high. Fortunately, low-cost approx-
imations to indexed portfolios are available.' 14 Of course no index is
a perfect proxy for an ideal market portfolio. Even if a fund were
available that represented every firm publicly traded on a United
States exchange" 5 or over the counter, the huge number of privately
held and foreign firms would be unrepresented. 116 Nevertheless, this
article refers to investors with interests in large numbers of securities
(500 or more) as indexed investors, and indexed investors will be as-
sumed to be diversified both across and within industries.
Indexed investors represent a large and growing proportion of the
market. Perhaps $300 billion was overtly indexed in 1990 and signifi-
cantly more is effectively, though not overtly indexed. 11 Wells Fargo
114. For example, the Vanguard Index Trust is a no-load (that is, a no entrance or exit fee)
fund that tracks the Standard & Poor's (S&P) 500 Index. Although it is a no load fund the return
on the Vanguard Index Trust and similar funds (the Wells Fargo Stagecoach Corporate Stock
Fund is another such fund) is slightly lower than thit of the S&P 500 due to transaction and
administrative costs. During the years 1979 to 1984, for example, the Vanguard Index Trust rate
of return was 0.49% less than that of the S&P 500. Statman, supra note 109, at 358-59.
115. The S&P 500 represents about 75% of the total market value of all publicly traded
stocks in the United States. WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., STAGECOACH FrsDS, PROSPaCTUS, COR-
PORATE STOCK Fm app. A-I (May 3, 1993) [hereinafter WELLS FARGO STAcECOACH STOCK
FUND].
116. By some estimates, an ideally diversified securities portfolio would have only about a
quarter of its assets invested in United States firms.
117. Louis Lowenstein, Why Managements Should (And Should Not) Have Respect for
Their Shareholders, 17 J. CORP. L. 1, 12 (1991). -This figure is up from $50 billion in 1984, id.,
and is surely much higher today. Many large institutional investors are "effectively" indexed, due
to the size of their funds. The growth of institutional investors in recent years and the potential
benefits and concerns related with this growth has been well documented. See Mark J. Roe, The
Modem Corporation and Private Pensions, 41 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 75, 76 (1993) (noting that
"[a]lthough in 1970 pension funds owned only $78.2 billion in equity, less than nine percent of
the stock market, by 1993, pensions owned $1.5 trillion of stock, accounting for nearly one-third
of the stock market."); Agents Watching Agents, supra note 64; The Value of Institutional Inves-
tor Monitoring, supra note 64; John M. Conley & William M. O'Barr, The Culture of Capital:
An Anthropological Investigation of Institutional Investment, 70 N.C. L. REv. 823 (1992); Cof-
fee, supra note 87.
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alone, for example, manages over $50 billion in indexed funds."'
The interests of indexed shareholders are maximized in a slightly,
though significantly, different way than diversified shareholders.
While the fortunes of the holdings of a diversified shareholder may be
assumed to be independent, 1 9 the fortunes of an indexed portfolio are
less so, particularly with respect to technological innovation. This is
because a valuable new technological innovation will only increase
the market value of some diversified portfolios (those exploiting the
innovation) while it can be expected to increase the market value of all
indexed portfolios. For this reason, indexed investors will want firm
managers to make decisions that increase indexed portfolio values,
rather than the market value of individual firms. 120 As with the diver-
sified investor, maximization of portfolio value maximizes indexed in-
vestor welfare regardless of the personal preferences of the individual
shareholders, because the consumption preferences of any individual
shareholder can be adjusted to match her particular preferences by
borrowing or lending against the increased value of her portfolio. 121
b. Managers
The central role of management1 22 in the success or failure of
firms is unquestioned. Likewise, management plays a central role in
determining the success or failure of a firm's R&D efforts. This role
goes beyond determining the magnitude of R&D expenditures-the
character and quality of the R&D effort is to a great extent determined
by a finn's management. 123
Managers will make decisions so as to maximize the personal
118. See WEus FaRo STAGECOACH STOCK FuND, supra note 115.
119. This is strictly true only if the securities are randomly selected. Stock picking inves-
tors might purposely "hedge" their selection so that if one firm falters, it is expected that another
firm in the portfolio would prosper. Hedging, however, is imperfect, and not necessarily the best
strategy for reducing portfolio risk. Indeed, it is possible that hedging could introduce additional
systematic risks relative to a randomly-picked portfolio. As a first-order approximation, the
assumption of independence is a reasonable one.
120. It is, of course, quite another matter as to whether managers would be so instructed.
Firm managers have little control over indexed portfolio values and thus to compensate them on
the basis of portfolio performance would represent either a windfall or undeserved punishment
for managers.
121. See, e.g., EAsTERROOK & Fiscm., supra note 17, at 120 and sources cited therein.
122. Management refers to the corporate directors, officers and those employees whose pri-
mary responsibilities are decision-making rather than decision-implementing. See Roy Radner,
Hierarchy: The Economics of Managing, J. EcoN. Lrr., Sept. 1992, at 1382, 1383 (defining
managing as "figuring out what to do," in contrast to "doing it").
123. See, e.g., Kamien & Schwartz, supra note 30, at 10 (noting that studies have shown
that "emphasis on good management throughout the firm, with excellent working relationships
and communications among the R&D, production, and marketing departments is a recurring
theme in comparative studies of success and failure in innovations:).
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utility of the individual managers. While some managers may receive
personal satisfaction from maximizing shareholder utility,2 4 most
managers' personal utility is measured by more than firm market
value. Such managers will seek to maximize their own pecuniary 25
and psychic126 benefits.
Managers' investment in their firms is, unlike that of sharehold-
ers, nondiversifiable. The nondiversifiable nature of the manager's in-
vestment is due to several factors. The manager's job is typically her
most important investment, providing disproportionately more income
to the manager than any single investment brings the diversified inves-
tor. 27 Because of their investment in firm-specific capital, managers
are typically worth more to their present employers than they could
demand on the external job market.'28 A manager's investment in her
employing firm is illiquid'29 and non-fungible.' 30
Just as the interests of diversified shareholders differ from those
of indexed shareholders and underdiversified shareholders, the inter-
ests of middle managers differ from those of senior managers. For the
purpose of this discussion, senior managers are defined somewhat
loosely as those managers with firm-wide responsibility and authority.
Thus, the board of directors, the officers, and perhaps other "senior
executives" qualify as senior managers. Middle managers, then, are
defined here as other management personnel with input to R&D in-
vestment decisions (they need not necessarily have supervisory
responsibilities).
124. Such managers belong to a "noblesse oblige" school of management. But see Eisen-
berg, supra note 19, at 1473 (noting that while self-esteem will prevent most managers from
shirking and unfair self-dealing, managers may not even recognize the existence of positional
conflicts).
125. Pecuniary benefits include salary, benefits, and often most significantly, stock-based
forms of compensation.
126. Psychic benefits include job security, prestige, power, etc.
127. See Coffee, supra note 87, at 17 (noting that "the manager's most important asset is his
or her job"). That managers may receive a significant part, even the majority, of their compensa-
tion in some stock-based form does not diminish the importance of the job to the manager, nor,
certainly, does it diversify her portfolio. Even directors who can sit on multiple boards can only
achieve limited diversification.
128. Professor Coffee notes two other factors for a management overinvestment in the firms
for which they serve: managers are often compensated in the form of nontransferable interests in
their firms as a reducing agency costs, and managers' liability for corporate action may not be
limited as is the case with shareholders. Id. at 18-19.
129. It is difficult for managers to exit firms and extract the full "value" of their investment.
130. The investment is personal in that managers are investing, in part, in their own reputa-
tions. Reputational concerns may cause managers to reject high-risk, high-payoff projects for
lower-risk, lower-payoff projects. See Thakor, supra note 13, at 131. See also Fama, supra note
62, at 292 ("For the purposes of the managerial labor market, the previous associations of a
manager with success and failure are information about his talents.").
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The interests of senior managers are more closely aligned with
those of underdiversified investors than with those of diversified or
indexed investors, while middle managers' interests may more closely
resemble those of diversified investors for several reasons. First, se-
nior managers have generally invested a great deal of firm-specific
personal capital in their firms, 3 ' typically more than middle manag-
ers, due primarily to their greater length of time spent with the firm
and the nature of the duties performed for the firm. Second, the port-
folios of senior managers is likely to be less diverse than those of
middle managers because the future income of the senior manager is
generally more dependent on her current employerl32 than that of mid-
dle managers.' 3 Finally, senior managers' compensation tends to be
based more on firm quarterly or annual financial results than that of
middle managers, who are compensated more on their individual or
departmental performance.
The above discussion suggests that, as with underdiversified
shareholders, senior managers will be more risk-averse, more con-
cerned with appropriability, and have a shorter time horizon with re-
spect to R&D investments than will middle managers. The
differences in interests among managers, however, is probably not
nearly as great as those among shareholders. Furthermore, because
senior managers are, by definition, the firm policy-makers, their inter-
ests will have a greater effect on firm behavior than the interests of
middle managers. For these reasons, the interests of senior managers
in R&D spending is used as a proxy for the interests of managers
generally for the remainder of this article.
2. R&D Characteristics and Interests
a. Risk
Risk is an important factor in any investment decision. Investors
in the securities markets are concerned with two kinds of risk: system-
atic and diversifiable orfirm-specific risk.' Systematic risk is risk
of an event that causes a shift in the overall securities markets-inter-
est rate changes or political developments, for example, might move
the entire market up or down. 35 Diversifiable risk is risk of an event
that causes a relative shift between a particular security or a particular
131. The value of senior managers to their employers is usually far greater than their value
to other firms, though this is not always reflected in salaries.
132. This income may take the form of future ordinary salary, deferred earnings, pensions,
stock options, and retirement benefits.
133. Middle managers are more likely to have other employers in their futures.
134. See EASTERBROOK & FscHaE., supra note 17, at 121; Coffee, supra note 87, at 19.
135. See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & Fiscim., supra note 17, at 121.
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industry and the rest of the market.' 36 Holders of a diversified portfo-
lio of securities are relatively unconcerned with diversifiable risk. The
value of diversified portfolio will, on average, be unchanged by a
diversifiable-risk event and a fully diversified portfolio should never
be changed by such an event. The cost of portfolio diversification is
so low 137 that it can be assumed that underdiversified investors are not
risk-averse. 138
The possibility of a merger proceeding at an unfair price is an
example of diversifiable risk event. 139 If the shareholders of a target
get a bad deal, it follows that the shareholders of the bidder get a good
deal. The fully diversified investor is indifferent to such an event
since her portfolio value is unaffected.
140
As discussed earlier, R&D investments are inherently risky.
These risks are of at least three types: (1) there is the technology risk
that a particular R&D project will not be technically successful; 14 ' (2)
there is the market risk that a particular R&D project will be techni-
cally successful but will not result in a profit on the market for any
firm;142 and (3) there is the appropriability risk that a particular R&D
project will result in a net profit on the market, but not necessarily for
the sponsoring firm.143
136. Id.
137. Mutual funds are an inexpensive means to achieve diversification. Easterbrook and
Fischel point out that the cost of diversification is actually lower than non-diversification be-
cause the diversified investor avoids the expense of selecting and monitoring stocks. EAsmTR-
BROOK & FiscmHE, supra note 17, at 122.
138. See EASTMREROOK & FiscHm., supra note 17, at 30; Coffee, supra note 87, at 17 (not-
ing that modem financial theory assumes that investors hold diversified portfolios). Professor
Coffee suggests that the availability of diversification implies that some investors may even be
risk preferrers, since a diversified investor may view equity investments as "high" risk and desire
such risk to offset other, "low" risk investments. Coffee, supra note 87, at 19.
139. See EAsTERBROOK & FiscmHE, supra note 17, at 122 (describing corporate control
transactions as diversifiable risk events).
140. Actually, this is a somewhat oversimplified account. Transaction costs (legal and in-
vestment banking fees, for example) might reduce the portfolio value, especially if the price were
distorted so that assets were not moved to the higher valued use as between seller and buyer.
Nevertheless, the example suffices for present purposes.
141. The technology risks are lower than many might believe. Research by Edwin Mans-
field estimated that the average probability of technical success for R&D projects in the elec-
tronic equipment, proprietary drug, and chemical industry ranged from 0.52 to 0.68. SCHERER,
INNOVATION AND GROWTH, supra note 29, at 120 (citing EDWIN MANsFmLD, INDusTRIAL RE-
SEARCH AND TECHNoLoICAL INNOvATION 59 (1968), and EDWIN MANSFIELD, ET AL., REs-ARCH
AND INNOVATION IN THE MODERN CORPORATION 35-36, 41-42 (1971)).
142. There might just not be a significant market for the innovation. The market success
rate is often lower than the technical success rate.
143. The other firm might have been successful first or might merely imitate the innovation
of the first firm. This would be possible if the innovation were not patentable, or the patent were
easily designed around, for example. Imitation is often a successful innovation strategy. See
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Research and development projects which are best characterized
by their technology and market risk tend to reside near the basic re-
search end of the R&D spectrum. At the outset of the project, it is
unclear if the technology will work or if there is a market for the
product. R&D projects which are best characterized by their ap-
propriability risk, in contrast, tend toward the development end of the
R&D spectrum. At the outset of the project there is an identifiable
market and likely profit for some firm or firms, but no guarantee of
commercial success for any particular firm. 144
i. Shareholders
The different types of R&D risk correspond roughly to the differ-
ent types of investment risk. Applied research and development, with
its appropriability risk, is largely a diversifiable risk. By hypothesis,
some firm will profit from the investment. To the indexed investor, it
does not matter which firm profits and which firm loses. Basic re-
search is a systematic risk. If unsuccessful,145 it represents a dead-
weight loss.1" There is no gain to other firms to compensate for the
loss. Thus, it would follow that the risk aversion of indexed share-
holders is greater with respect to basic research investments than with
respect to applied research and development investments, and the risk
aversion of indexed shareholders is less than that of diversified or un-
derdiversified shareholders with respect to all types of R&D
investments.
ii. Managers
As discussed above, managers are inherently risk averse eco-
nomic actors. Thus, managers will be more risk-averse than share-
holders when making investment decisions, including R&D
investment decisions, for the firm.147 As Professor Coffee points out,
the risk-aversion of managers is not necessarily contrary to share-
holder interests-the absence of any firm-specific risk-aversion might
ScHERE, INNOVAT NO AND GROWTH, supra note 29, at 92-93 (discussing successful imitation
strategies of IBM and Procter and Gamble).
144. At the time of this writing, investment in HDTV research today would appear to be an
example of a diversifiable risk. Some standard will be adopted and many units eventually sold,
but it is unclear at this time whose standard will be selected and which firms will eventually
profit. As noted earlier, the technically successful firm will not necessarily be the most
profitable.
145. "Unsuccessfur' basic research here is defined from the perspective of the investor-
i.e., it is research from which no revenues are generated.
146. This, of course, ignores the value of any knowledge gained through the failure.
147. See Coffee, supra note 87, at 19.
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lead to management indifference as to the firm's fortunes. 48 Thus, a
differential risk-aversion as between shareholders and managers is not
an agency cost unless this difference is reflected in a lower market
price for the firm's securities.149
The riskiness of R&D and the "risk-aversion differential"'150 be-
tween managers and shareholders is a potential agency cost source.
Managers' relative risk-aversion with respect to shareholders will con-
stitute an agency cost if it causes managers to invest in R&D at less
than the rate that optimizes firm market value.' 51 The general risk-
aversion of managers may be amplified with respect to research and
development investment decisions. Because American managers sel-
dom have technology backgrounds, 52 they have difficulty understand-
ing the benefits of technology for products and processes and may
148. Id.
149. Could differential risk-aversion as between managers and investors then actually lead
to "agency benefit" for shareholders? Of course. There are many forms of agency benefits
(division of labor benefits were discussed earlier). Thus, the concern ought to be "do agency
costs outweigh agency benefits," not "are there agency costs associated with the transaction."
Similarly, reduction in agency benefits should be included in the agency cost minimization
calculus.
150. Coffee, supra note 87, at 20.
151. Presumably, an owner would invest (or at least try to invest) in R&D at precisely the
rate that optimized share market value.
152. See, e.g., PoRTER, supra note 39, at 527. Porter notes that there is a steadily decreasing
number of senior managers at American corporations with technical backgrounds, as opposed to
the abundance of technically oriented managers in Germany and Japan, for example. Porter
blames this in part on the diversion of talent in America from the technical fields into law,
medicine and finance. Id. See also William J. Abernathy & Robert H. Hayes, Managing Our
Way to Economic Decline, HLv. Bus. REv., July-Aug. 1980, at 67, 74-75 (attributing short-
sighted investment policies of United States firms to the large number of corporate managers
trained in law or finance rather than science or engineering).
Attempting to quantify assertions such as those of Porter and Abemathy and Hayes, F.M
Scherer and Keun Huh examined the relationship between corporate officers' education and
R&D investment in Top Managers' Education and R&D Investment, 21 Rs. PoL'Y 507 (1992).
Scherer and Huh studied 308 R&D intensive corporations and the educational backgrounds of
their two highest ranking officers during the period 1971-1987. They found that the percentage
of firms to which at least one of the two top officers was trained in science or engineering slowly
increased from 1971 to 1980, peaked, and has been in decline since. Id. at 508. The percentage
of firms with an MBA or a lawyer in one of the two top spots has steadily increased and de-
clined, respectively, during the 1971-1987 timeframe. Id. Over the 17 year period, the R&D
intensity of the firms averaged 3.12 percent. Id. at 509. Scherer and Huh found that having a
scientist or engineer in one of the two top positions added a statistically significant 0.30 percent-
age points (i.e., increased R&D intensity to 3.42 percent) and a lawyer added a statistically
significant 0.24 percent, while an MBA actually decreased R&D intensity by 0.03 percentage
points (though this last result was found not to be statistically significant). Id. The authors also
looked at various combinations of education of the two top corporate officers. The combination
of lawyer and engineer was most conducive to R&D intensity, adding a whopping 0.76 percent-
age points. The combination of lawyer and MBA the least conducive, decreasing R&D intensity
by 0.12 percentage points (both statistically significant). Id. at 509-10.
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lack the confidence and conviction to invest in it.' 53
The management/R&D risk-aversion problem is further compli-
cated by management hierarchies present at most large firms, particu-
larly with respect to R&D decisions. For example, decisions
concerning a change of control transaction might be discussed among
only a few senior officers and the board of directors, but R&D deci-
sions might be discussed among department managers, section manag-
ers, vice presidents, etc., in addition to the top decision makers. This
additional decisional hierarchy is due to several factors. First, R&D
ideas often percolate up from individual researchers rather than down
from senior management.' 54 Second, as discussed above, manage-
ment often has little or no technological expertise and thus may be
more likely to defer to specialists than they would for "ordinary" busi-
ness investment decisions.
One effect of the R&D decision-making hierarchy is to give more
decision makers an opportunity to "just say no."'5'  There can be
merit in this approach considering that decision makers further down
the hierarchy will tend to have more technological expertise.' 56 But
this expertise differential is accompanied by a risk-aversion differen-
tial as well. Even at large companies that can afford to fund a diversi-
fied portfolio of research projects, the career of a middle-level
manager can depend on the outcome of a single project.' 57
153. This lack of technical expertise may lead to "herd" behavior by managers who make
R&D investment decisions that do not deviate from the "norm." See Thakor, supra note 13, at
131 (citing David Schaferstein & Jeremy Stein, Herd Behavior and Investment, MIT Sloan
Working Paper # 2062-88).
154. It is not hard to imagine a junior scientist at a corporation suggesting that management
invest in research in a particular area and that management would solicit her input. It is much
more difficult to conceive of management interest in that scientist's (or for that matter a young
accountant's) idea that the corporation merge with or acquire some other firm or sell a division
of the firm to another corporation.
155. See, e.g., ScHRaE, a IDMUSTRIAL MARKET STRucruRE, supra note 26, at 414 (noting
that risk spreading decisions are made by individuals, not firms, so the theoretical ability of large
firms to bear risk may not pan out-but the decision-making process in a large firm will involve
more people and more individuals will have an opportunity to object to investment decisions).
156. The corporate Vice President for Research and Development is likely to be more tech-
nologically informed than the CEO, and the manager of the Compound Semiconductor Research
department more informed than the VP in her area of expertise.
157. Passell, supra note 55. For a large firm that makes many R&D investments, "the firm
itself, is a diversified portfolio." Coffee, supra note 87, at 20. Thus, a CEO might be indifferent
to the failure of a single project (if sufficiently small), the Vice President of Research and Devel-
opment might be somewhat risk-averse, and the department manager's career might depend upon
a successful outcome.
Management risk aversion may not only result in sub-optimal R&D investment levels, it can
also result in management choosing the wrong R&D projects from among the options available
to it. For example, when presented with a choice between two projects with the same expected
value and different downside risks (i.e., costs of failure), most managers would instinctively
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b. Time horizon
The fundamental premise underlying the myopic market model is
that shareholders, particularly institutional shareholders, have a very
short investment time horizon. 158 As an initial observation, there is
little question that some institutional investors159 adopt a fairly short-
term outlook with respect to their stock positions.160 For example, in
1987 institutional investors held approximately one third of all corpo-
rate stock and yet accounted for some seventy percent of all trades on
the New York Stock Exchange. 6' Mutual fund managers and invest-
ment advisors turn over sixty to sixty-five percent of their portfolios
each year. 62 Critics claim that short-term trading such as this forces
managers to adopt a short-term outlook as well, focusing exclusively
on the current quarter's earnings at the expense of long-term invest-
ment, including research and development. 63
i. Shareholders
Despite the short-term time horizon in terms of securities posi-
tions, however, there is little statistical evidence showing that share-
holders are averse to long-term investment by the underlying firms.
Rather, the available evidence indicates that the market is fully capa-
ble of setting share prices based on both short-term and long-term
earnings prospects: "the stock market discounts the firm's expected
future profits into a price that accurately reflects expectations of the
choose the project with the least downside risk. In fact, a recent analysis showed that this is
exactly the wrong decision for maximizing shareholder wealth. Peter A. Morris et al., When
Choosing R&D Projects, Go with Long Shots, REs. TEcH. MANAGEMENT, Jan.-Feb. 1991, at 35.
158. See supra notes 11 to 12 and accompanying text.
159. Here I refer to the portfolio managers rather than the fund investors.
160. Many are under constant pressure to attempt to outperform the market and thus move
in and out of stocks in an attempt to beat the indexes. Others may be under pressure to generate
trading revenue. But see Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 76, at 863 (noting that "[s]ome of the
largest institutional investors today are longterm investors. For example, the annual turnover
rate of [CaIPERS'] equity portfolio is approximately ten percent, and its average holding period
for particular stocks is between six and ten years.').
161. Bruce Nussbaum & Judith H. Dobrzynski, The Battle for Corporate Control; Manage-
ment is Being Assailed From All Sides. Who's in Charge Here?, Bus. WK., May 18, 1987, at
102.
162. Id.
163. See, e.g., PoRamE, supra note 39, at 528-29. "Company goals have also shifted in ways
that undermine the upgrading of industry" Id. at 528. By this Porter refers to the increased
influence of institutional investors whom he asserts are interested only in quarterly earnings
performance. Id. There is no incentive for investors to seek companies with attractive long-term
prospects and that are reinvesting earnings rather than paying dividends. Id. Porter blames this
in part on the taxation of capital gains at nearly the same rate as ordinary 'income. Id. The
United States, says Porter, is one of the few "advanced" nations that taxes capital gains at all. Id.
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firm's true value."'" For example, start-up companies with no cur-
rent earnings and no realistic prospect of earnings in the near future
are able to raise investment capital by selling equity in the market.1 65
Further, differing market expectations for long-term earnings are evi-
denced in the wide variation of price-to-earnings ratios seen among
listed stocks.1 66
ii. Managers
The investment time horizon of utility-maximizing senior corpo-
rate managers tends to be short. Senior corporate managers tend to
have relatively short tenures in their positions, as such managers often
accede to their positions late in their careers and keep these positions
for only a few years. 67 More junior managers often move from posi-
tion to position within the firms (or worse, from firm to firm). 168
Thus, few managers who invest in long-term research and develop-
ment projects will be around to reap any benefits from such
investments. 169
Management, particularly senior management, often receives a
significant portion of its compensation in the form of bonuses based
on annual or quarterly results. 170  There is little incentive for these
managers to reduce the current year's bonus in the hope of a higher
one in future years, due to their short tenure in office. 17 1
164. Corporate Takeovers: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Con-
sumer Protection, and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong., 1st
Sess. 368 [hereinafter Corporate Takeovers] (statement of Charles F. Rule).
165. Id. at 181-82 (statement of Joseph R. Wright).
166. GRnoo A. JARREU. Er AL., SECURITUIS AND ExcuANao COMMISSION, INsTITnuTONAL
OwNERsHw, TENDER OFFERS, AND LONo-TERm INvErrirrs 1985 [hereinafter SEC REPORT]
reprinted in Corporate Takeovers, supra note 164, at 382. On a typical day the price to earnings
(P/E) ratio of shares listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), for example, will vary
from about 1 up to nearly 100. Price to earnings ratios of 15-20 and above reflect the market's
expectation that a firm will be more profitable in the future than it is today. Corporate Take-
overs, supra note 164, at 367 (statement of Charles F. Rule).
167. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 19, at 1495.
168. Id.
169. See, e.g., Richard H. Leet, How Top Management Sees R&D, REs. TEcH. MANAOB-
mEN-r, Jan.-Feb. 1991, at 15 ("Senior managers are tempted to reduce 'research' effort because,
after all, new cutting-edge technology is probably not going to affect the company during their
careers. (As a matter of fact, it probably will affect them-it may cause reduced profits and rates
of return.)").
170. See, e.g., Thomas Lee Hazen, The Short-Term/Lng-Term Dichotomy and Investment
Theory: Implications for Securities Market Regulation and for Corporate Law, 70 N.C. L. REv.
137, 180 (1991).
171. PORTER, supra note 39, at 528-29. Some commentators have noted that shareholders
can see through management over-emphasis on short-term returns at the expense of long-term
investments, and that managers will not be rewarded for an attractive bottom line achieved at the
expense of the future profitability of the corporations. See, e.g., John C. Anjier, Comment, Anti-
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The short investment time horizon of managers is likely to have
the greatest impact on the length of the longest term research and de-
velopment investments. Thus, among R&D investments, managers
are likely to be least disposed towards investments in basic research
and most disposed towards applied research and development.
c. Appropriability
Appropriability refers to the ability of the sponsoring company to
collect quasi-rents 172 from its innovation.173  Returns from R&D in-
vestments are less appropriable than other kinds of investments due to
the "public goods" aspects of inventions and innovations.174 Patenta-
ble innovations, for example, may enjoy greater appropriability than
non-patentable innovations, since no exclusive right to make, use, or
sell attaches to the latter. On the other hand, many patents can be
designed around quickly enough and at modest enough cost to over-
come the "first-to-market" advantage of the innovator.175
i. Shareholders
As alluded to earlier in the discussion of shareholder risk aver-
sion, diversified shareholders would be indifferent to the ap-
propriability of results of research and development investments. 76
As long as profits are made, it matters little to the diversified investor
which firm makes the profits. The diversified investor should appro-
priate her share of all of the profits. 177 In fact, it is possible that diver-
sified investors would prefer to see no appropriability, since in such a
Takeover Statutes, Shareholders, Stakeholders and Risk, 51 LA. L. REv. 561, 593-94 (1990).
Unfortunately, there may be inadequate incentives for atomized, diversified investors to perform
the sort of monitoring required by such an argument.
172. A quasi-rent is a return on an asset that exceeds its current costs of use. See Armen A.
Alchian, Rent, in THE NEw PA arAvE: THE WORLD OF ECONOMICS 591,592-93 (John Eatwell et
al., eds. 1987).
173. See, e.g., Jorde & Teece, supra note 36, at 6.
174. One measure of the low appropriability of R&D investment are the high rates of social
returns-returns to society as a whole-from private investments in R&D. These returns are
estimated at anywhere from 50 to 200 percent See Edwin Mansfield, Social Returns from R&D:
Findings, Methods and Limitations, RES. TECH. MANAGEmErr, Nov.-Dec. 1991, at 24.
175. See David J. Teece, Capturing the Financial Benefits from Technological Innovation,
in TECmoLOGY AND THE WEaLTH OF NATIONs, supra note 7, at 175, 177. Indeed, the patent
system is intended in part to provide incentives for innovators to invent-around adversely held
patents. See, e.g., Texas Instruments v. U.S. Intern. Trade Comm'n, 804 F.2d 1558, 1572 (Fed.
Cir. 1986).
176. See supra notes 145 to 146 and accompanying text.
177. Martin Baily, a University of Maryland economist, estimates that, due to the difficulty
of appropriating rents, society's overall returns on research and development is at least double
the private return. Passell, supra note 55.
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regime the most efficient producers will prevail and transaction costs
will be minimized.
Shareholder antipathy towards strong appropniability of intellec-
tual property has recently been the subject of an empirical study. This
study sought to determine the value of patents to the securities markets
by studying the abnormal returns on a corporation's stock following a
judicial finding of patent invalidity.17 8 The study examined the mar-
ket behavior of 108 securities for a period of 5 days prior to and 15
days following findings of patent invalidity (at both trial and appellate
level).1 7 9 The study concluded that, on average, the patent invalidity
judgments did not adversely affect the abnormal (i.e., net of market)
return performance of the securities studied.'8 0 The implication is
that, accepting the efficient capital markets hypothesis,' sharehold-
ers are indifferent to the news that the courts have found a firm's pat-
ent invalid.
ii. Managers
Because managers' investment portfolios are so firm-specific,
they will favor investments with a high degree of appropriability.
They can receive little or no benefit from other firms that appropriate
gains from their firm's investment. These managers would prefer to
invest in tangible assets, such as a new plant or perhaps better yet, a
new corporate jet or other perquisite.18 2
3. Summary of the Model
The above description of an agency cost model for corporate
R&D investment is summarized below in Table 1. One of the more
useful parameters shown in Table 1, and one that is referred to fre-
quently in the empirical studies discussed in part 1H, is R&D intensity.
178. Page M. Kaufman, An Empirical Study of the Effect of Patent Invalidity Judgments on
the Abnormal Returns of Publicly Traded Securities, 19 AIPLA QJ. 282 (1991). Abnormal
returns analysis is used in an attempt to isolate the effect of a given piece of information (here,
the patent invalidity) on the securities market. Id. at 286-87.
179. Id. at 292.
180. Id. at 308. Of course, in certain high-profile "bet your company" cases, rulings on
intellectual property rights can have spectacular effects on share prices. See, e.g., Don Clark,
AMD Rushes Into Intel's Turf, S.F. CHRON., April 20, 1993 at C1 (reporting that the stock of
Intel lost 11 percent of its value and the stock of AMD increased by 12 percent of its value on the
day following a ruling adverse to Intel in the long-running copyright dispute between the two
firms).
181. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Effi-
ciency, 70 VA. L. REv. 549 (1984).
182. See, e.g., BRIAN BuRRows AND JoHN HELYAR, BARaAIuANS AT THE GATE: THE FALL
oF RJR NAaisco 94 (1990) (describing RJR Nabisco CEO Ross Johnson's fleet of corporate jets
and specially commissioned "raj Mahal of corporate hangars").
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Research and development intensity simply refers to total R&D spend-
ing by a firm as a percent of sales.1 13 R&D intensity is an effective
way to measure the level of R&D activity at firms because it allows
year-to-year comparisons without adjusting for inflation and it allows
for comparisons of firms of disparate size.'
TABLE 1: Tim DIVERGENT INTERESTS OF SHAREHOLDERS AND
MANAGERS IN R&D SPENDING
UNDER-
DIVERSIFIED DrVFIneD INDEXED
SHAREHOLDERS SHAREHOLDERS SHAREHOLDERS MANAGERS
firm portfolio index personal
MAXIMAND market market market uersona
value value value utility
RISK AVERSION extreme moderate low extreme
INVSMN
CHARACrERISCS important important not important important
" appropriability short medium long short
" time horizon disfavored disfavored disfavored disfavored
" basic research
DasmED R&D low medium high low
INTmNSrrY
Table 1 demonstrates why it is important to break down share-
holders into their constituent components when looking at agency
costs in corporate R&D investment decisions. In fact, rather than sim-
ple opposing interests of shareholders and managers, it is seen that
there are groups of shareholders whose interests are closely aligned
with those of managers (underdiversified shareholders, who prefer low
R&D intensity) and those whose interests diverge substantially from
managers (indexed shareholders, who prefer high R&D intensity).
The fact that different categories of shareholders have different
interests with respect to R&D investment greatly complicates any
agency cost analysis. Indeed, the divergence of interests among dif-
ferent categories of shareholders may itself be a form of agency cost.
The remainder of this article, however, focuses on the divergent inter-
ests of indexed investors and managers. As discussed earlier, indexed
investors represent a large and rapidly growing percentage of all
shareholders.1 " This is so for several reasons. Underdiversified and
diversified investors can easily index if they so choose, due to the low
cost 6f investment in indexed funds. Perhaps most importantly, the
183. See, e.g., Kamien & Schwartz, supra note 30, at 16.
184. This is because this measure of R&D activity is self-normalizing.
185. See supra notes 117 to 118 and accompanying text.
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interests of indexed investors are more closely aligned with societal
interests than are those of non-indexed investors. The perfectly in-
dexed investor is interested only in the growth of the overall economy
and is unconcerned with whether individual firms are "winners" or
"losers". Similarly, overall economic growth is, as a general proposi-
tion, the economic goal of society rather than the success or failure of
individual firms.
Table 1 indicates that shareholders and managers would appear to
agree on one aspect of R&D investment: both disfavor basic research
and prefer applied research and development. Thus, the relative low
level of spending on basic research is not properly characterized as an
agency cost. The almost purely public good aspect of basic research
may make this an area that is poorly suited for performance by the
private sector.
I. TEsTING THE MODEL: SoME EMPIRIcAL RESULTS
Part II presented an agency-cost-based alternative to the "my-
opic" market explanation for corporate underinvestment in R&D. The
remainder of this article examines the available empirical data on cor-
porate R&D to see if the underlying premises upon which the agency
cost model is based are sound; and to see if the agency cost model can
explain phenomena unaccounted for in the myopic market model.
A. Market Responses to Firm R&D Spending
The divergent interests of shareholders and managers in corpo-
rate R&D investment have been discussed above in theoretical terms.
Shareholders, seeking to maximize the portfolio market, are risk-neu-
tral, unconcerned with appropriability, and have long-term time hori-
zons. Shareholders thus favor a high level of R&D investment
intensity. Managers' interests diverge considerably from those of
shareholders. They seek to maximize personal utility and are thus
risk-averse. Managers prefer investments that are low risk, have a
high degree of appropriability, and have a relatively short time hori-
zon. Managers, thus, favor a low level of R&D intensity. Is this the-
ory supported by empirical data? While the answer is not conclusive,
the data certainly suggests that agency costs are a better explanation
for corporate underinvestment than are myopic markets. This section
presents data in support of the premise that shareholders favor a high
level of R&D intensity. The next section will present data in support
of the proposition that management favors a low level of R&D
investment.
Although the anecdotal evidence concerning shareholder views
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as to R&D spending by firms is mixed,1 86 statistical studies have
shown that stock prices react positively to news of research and devel-
opment investment. The Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), for
example, studied the market reaction to announcements of new R&D
projects at 62 firms between 1973 and 1983, and found that on an-
nouncement day, firms experienced a statistically significant 0.45%
positive abnormal (net of market) return,"8 7 followed by an additional
0.35% positive abnormal return the next trading day.188 After 20 trad-
ing days, the cumulative positive abnormal returns were 1.80%.189
Another study, this one by economist Ariel Pakes, showed signif-
icant correlation of stock prices with unexpected changes (i.e.,
changes that could not be predicted from past values) in R&D invest-
ment. 11 Pakes discovered that, on average, an unexpected increase of
$100 in R&D expenditures is associated with a $1,870 increase in the
value of the firm.191 Some of the exotic formulae used by certain
186. There are any number of examples of stocks realizing dramatic jumps upon announce-
ments of results of research and development activities, especially for technology stocks. One
day in November 1992, for example, saw Synergen's stock rise by 5 percent on an announce-
ment that it had finished one stage of drug testing and was about to begin another, and Gensia
Pharmaceuticals' shares jumped 10 percent upon the.news that it would file for approval to
market a new drug. Joan O'C. Hamilton, Biotech May Be Flying too Near the Sun Again, Bus.
WKt., Nov. 23, 1992, at 110.
There is, of course, also plenty of anecdotal evidence to support an assertion of shareholder
antipathy towards corporate research and development spending as well. For example, analysts
recently applauded Eastman Kodak's decision to bring in a new chief financial officer noted for
cutting long-term investments in order to improve short-term cash flow. The analysts stated that
Kodak needed to cut back on research and development spending and that layoffs of a substantial
number of research and development personnel would "not hurt Kodak's reputation with inves-
tors ... [who would not] be terrified if Kodak cut back on R&D." Ellen Freilich, Talking Pointi
Eastman Kodak, Rumrrs, Jan. 11, 1993. Consider also William Broad's report of one invest-
ment advisor's 1990 admonition to corporate researchers:
"All of you are a variable expense," a Wall Street advisor told corporate research
chiefs in 1990 at a meeting of the Industrial Research Institute. "Let me repeat,"
he said, wagging his finger at the audience, "you are all a variable overhead
expense."
Ridden With Debt, supra note 45.
187. SEC REPORT, reprinted in Corporate Takeovers, supra note 164, at 391-92. For a
discussion of the methodology of market model event study methodologies, see Elliot J. Weiss &
Lawrence J. White, Of Econometrics and Indeterminacy: A Study of Investors' Reactions to
"Changes" in Corporate Law, 75 CAt. L. REv. 551, 579-82 (1987); G.William Schwert, Using
Financial Data to Measure Effects of Regulation, 24 J.L. & EcON. 121 (1981).
188. SEC REPORT, reprinted in Corporate Takeovers, supra note 164, at 391-92.
189. Id. Other studies have shown similar results. For example, one study determined that
announcements of increases in research and development spending are accompanied by a one
percent jump in stock price. Nussbaum & Dobrzynski, supra note 161.
190. Ariel Pakes, On Patents, R&D, and the Stock Market Rate of Return, 93 J. POL. EcoN.
390 (1985).
191. Id. at 402. Of course, it is possible that these results merely reflect the market's
knowledge that managers are myopic (or self-interested) with respect to R&D investments.
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analysts to pick undervalued technology stocks, such as market-capi-
talization-to-R&D-spending and market-capitalization-to-R&D-em-
ployees ratios, are further indication of market approval of R&D
spending.1 92
There is also evidence indicating that institutional investors spe-
cifically favor increased R&D investment by firms. For example, an
SEC study of 324 firms found that institutional ownership increased
from 30% in 1980 to 38% in 1984 at the same time that R&D intensity
was increasing from 3.3% to 4.03%.193 A regression analysis of this
data determined that there was a "direct and statistically significant
relationship between institutional ownership and R&D
expenditures." 194
B. Firm Size and R&D Intensity
It is more difficult to measure management disfavor of high R&D
intensity than shareholders' attraction to it. Investors indicate their
approval or disapproval of corporate actions by the millions of buy
and sell decisions they collectively make each day. 195 These buy and
sell decisions in turn raise or lower firms' share prices. Thus, the mar-
ket's reaction to R&D investment decisions is easily measurable, pro-
vided that share price movement attributable to R&D investment
decisions can be isolated from other factors affecting a firm's share
price.
No such analysis tool is readily available to measure management
attitudes towards R&D spending. Management, by its nature, decides
how much to invest in R&D rather than reacts to such decisions. For
this reason, this section will explore management attitudes towards
R&D spending in an indirect manner: by exploring the relationship
between firm size and R&D spending.
Thus, any project sufficiently, attractive to overcome management myopia must have a high
present value. See, e.g., Stein, supra note 13, at 77.
192. See Lawrence M. Fisher, Measuring Value Among Biotechs, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 5,
1992, at D10 (describing exotic valuation techniques); Emily S. Plishner, New Biotech Valuation
Model, CHEM. Wy,, Nov. 18, 1992, at 16 (same). But see Hamilton, supra note 186 (criticizing
such valuation techniques).
193. SEC REPORT, reprinted in Corporate Takeovers, supra note 164, at 387.
194. Id. at 387-88. The SEC cautions that this relationship does not carry any causal impli-
cations. In fact, the SEC report presented data indicating no causal relationship between institu-
tional ownership and R&D spending. Firms that experienced increased institutional ownership
during the study period increased R&D spending by 0.65% while those that experienced de-
creased institutional ownership increased R&D spending by 0.67%. Id. at 389. Despite the lack
of a causal relationship, the data indicate that institutional investors are at the least not deterred
from investing in firms with high R&D expenditures. Id. at 388.
195. This is referred to as the "wall Street rule" for expressing approval or disapproval of a
firm's policies and performance.
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The relationship between market structure and R&D investment
has been debated in the literature for many years. The debate ques-
tions which competitive market conditions are optimal for R&D in-
vestment. Traditional theory held that competitive markets were best,
since firms invested in R&D in the hope of obtaining monopoly prof-
its.19 6 Schumpeter challenged the traditional theory by proposing that
an existing monopoly position was most conducive for R&D invest-
ment, since firms with monopoly positions could most easily appropri-
ate the returns from such investments. 97 Yet a third school, perhaps
in the spirit of compromise, argued that an oligopoly structure was
best.198
The agency cost model outlined above is consistent with the
Schumpterian approach. Corporate managers with monopoly posi-
tions are likely to be less risk-averse, less concerned with firm-speci-
ficity and appropriability, and thus have a longer time horizon than
managers in competitive industries. 19 9
A related but different and less studied question concerns the re-
lationship between firm size and R&D. On the one hand, some com-
mentators stress that the high costs2  and risks of modem
technology2"' and economies of scale20°favor large firms.203 On the
other hand, commentators also note the disadvantages of large firms
196. See ScHnEaa, INMOVATION AND GROWTH, supra note 29, at 59.
197. See id.
198. Id.
199. It is said that the greatest of all monopoly profits is a leisurely life. Such leisure is
more conducive to long-term investing than the constant pressures of a competitive industry.
200. Galbraith, for one, believed that the large costs of modem technology could be borne
only by large firms:
There is no more pleasant fiction than that technical change is the product of the
matchless ingenuity of the small man forced by competition to employ his wits to
better his neighbor. Unhappily it is a fiction.... Because development is costly,
it follows that it can be carried on only by a firm that has the resources which are
associated with considerable size.
JoHN K. GALiArrm, AMmuCAN CAPrrALSM 86-87 (rev. ed. 1956), quoted in ScuaER, INDus-
TRiAL MARKEr STRucruR, supra note 26, at 413).
201. See, e.g., ScHERER, INDusnrA. MARKEr STRucruRF_, supra note 26, at 413-14 (noting
that due to the risks of innovation, small firms are unlikely or unable to invest all their resources
in a single innovative product).
202. See, e.g., id. at 414 (noting that (1) there are economies of scale in corporate R&D-
large companies can purchase expensive, specialized equipment that can be used by several
projects; (2) economies of scale from other aspects of the firms operations can be helpful to the
R&D-e.g., cheap capital, etc.; (3) large firms have greater incentive to develop process innova-
tions, since a given marginal gain will yield a larger absolute gain for the larger firm.)
203. An SEC report, for example, notes that if there are economies of scale in R&D, "a
common and sensible belief," it would be natural to expect a lower R&D intensity at the smaller
firms. See SEC REPORT, reprinted in.Corporate Takeovers, supra note 164, at 391.
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with respect to R&D." 4 While many of these disadvantages might be
characterized as agency costs, many go to the quality of the R&D
effort' 5 rather than the quantity of the R&D investment (or the R&D
intensity, in the terminology of this paper).
Organizations with large management bureaucracies will, as a
general .proposition, have higher agency costs than smaller organiza-
tions.2" This effect may be attenuated in management R&D invest-
ment decisions. The agency cost model of R&D investment discussed
above does not predict a strong dependence of R&D activity on firm
size. The risk-aversion of managers at small firms would be likely to
vary with firm size, since a single expensive failure could mean insol-
vency for the firm. However, once a firm was large enough to support
several R&D projects, none of which could "break" the firm, the risk-
aversion and time horizon of management with respect to R&D inten-
sity would not appear to be a strong function of firm size.
One factor discussed in the research and development investment
agency cost model would vary with firm size: the additional levels of
decisional hierarchy that make it more difficult to get R&D funding
proposals approved.2 °7 This factor, however, is expected to be a fairly
weak function of firm size. This is because, while numbers of manag-
ers would be expected to increase somewhat more than linearly with
firm size, levels of management will increase less than linearly. 08
204. Large corporations, for example, are often characterized by huge management bureau-
cracies. By one estimate, as many as one third of the employees of a large firm may be working
full time in activities that are part of, or support, the management process. Radner, supra note
122, at 1383. This compares to a figure of about 1 in 10 employees that were part of, or sup-
ported management in 1900. Id. at 1387.
205. For example, commentators have noted that innovations at larger firms tend not to be
as imaginative or revolutionary as at smaller firms. See ScEREan, INDusmI. MARKET SmRuc.
ruRE, supra note 26, at 414 (noting the "bias away from really imaginative innovations in the
laboratories of large firms). There is also a tendency in large corporate laboratories, as in all
bureaucracies, to be "over-organized," with researchers spending a significant amount of their
time writing reports and memoranda rather than performing actual research. See id. at 414-15.
Finally, in order to advance in most R&D organizations, researchers must give up individual
research and pursue careers in management. The "dual ladder' organizations offered at some
firms have not been effective at combating this phenomena: "it is still commonplace to find the
most able people in a laboratory devoting nearly all their time to supervising a swarm of drones.
This is not the way truly creative work gets done." Id. at 415.
206. In fact, largeness may itself be an agency cost, with management "growing" the firm at
shareholders' expense in order to increase their own amenities. See Harold Demsetz, The Struc-
ture of Ownership and the Theory of the Firm, 26 J.L. & ECON. 375, 377 (1983); Coffee, supra
note 87, at 29 (referring to the "managerialist" model of the firm where managers use the
residual funds left over after satisfying external constraints to expand the size of the firm, thereby
assuring themselves "greater compensation, greater psychic income, and greater security"),
207. This assumes that larger firms will have more levels of management hierarchy.
208. Consider the following extremely simplified model of firm management: every man-
ager has 7 "direct reports" Thus, the CEO has 7 people reporting to her, each of whom has
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Thus, an agency cost model of R&D investment decision making
would predict increasing R&D intensity up to a certain firm size, 2°9
followed by flat or slightly decreasing R&D intensity with increasing
firm size. In fact, empirical evidence appears to show exactly this
effect. Scherer, for example, reports that regression analysis has indi-
cated that "research and development employment or spending rose
either just proportionately or less than proportionately (i.e., exhibiting
diminishing returns) with firm size, especially after some size thresh-
old near the bottom range of Fortune's 500 industrials was
reached."21 Scherer and others found that the relationship between
firm size and R&D investment had an "inflection point," with R&D
spending increasing faster than firm size among smaller firms but
more slowly among larger firms, perhaps even falling with size among
the largest firms in some industries.211
seven people reporting to her, etc. This is known as a "branching hierarchy" and is the predomi-
nant structure of large organizations. See ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPOaTIoNs 812-815 (1986).
Everyone except those at the bottom-most level is considered a manager. The levels of manage-
ment in the firm is then the number of steps up the corporation organizational chart from the
lowest-level employee to the CEO. Under this model, numbers of managers and levels of man-
agement vary with firm size as follows:
Firm
size Managers Levels of Management
8 1 1
57 8 2
400 57 3
2,801 400 4
19,608 2,810 5
137,257 19608 6
Thus, for example, as firm size increases from 19,608 to 137, 257 (approximately a factor of 7),
the number of managers increases form 2,801 to 19,608 (also approximately a factor of 7).
However, the levels of management increase only from 5 to 6.
209. Small firms may spend a larger percentage of revenues on R&D because they are
young, growing concerns. See, e.g., Venture Industry Sponsors Study for Leverage on Hill,
CoRP. FiNANCmIo WK., Sept. 16, 1991, at 6 (reporting that a study of 235 venture portfolio
companies five years old or younger conducted by Coopers & Lybrand and Venture Economics
for the National Venture Capital Association in 1991 showed that venture-financed companies
invest nearly four times as much in R&D as Fortune 500 companies).
210. ScHuEm, IDUmSRAL MAREr STRucrun, supra note 26, at 420 tbl. 15.2. See also
Wesley A. Cann, Jr., Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Pursuit of Economic "Objectivity": Is
There Any Role for Social and Political Values in Merger Policy?, 60 Noma DAME L. REv. 273,
302 n.206 (1985) ("As firm size increases from large to giant, research and development effort
does not increase proportionately... " (quoting Michael P. Pertschuk & Kenneth M. Davidson,
What's Wrong With Conglomerated Mergers?, 48 FoRDamn L. R~v. 1 (1979)).
211.
By and large, there are no economies of scale with respect to firm size in the
invention process. The bulk of the evidence indicates that, among firms engaged
in R&D, relative effort tends to increase with size up to a point and then decline,
with middle size firms devoting the most effort relative to their size.
Kamien & Schwartz, supra note 30, at 3, 17-18.
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Similar results are obtained from an analysis of a recent Business
Week "R&D Scoreboard," an annual feature that tabulates R&D ex-
penditures as well as basic financial statistics for over 800 United
States firms.212 Figure 1, compiled from the Business Week raw data,
shows R&D intensity plotted against firm revenues. It is seen that
large numbers of smaller firms (under $400 million in revenues) have
high R&D intensity levels, many in excess of fifteen percent.213
Larger firms spend proportionately less. The dark, bold line shows
average R&D intensity by firm size. Thus, firms with annual revenues
of less than $1 billion average 5.0% R&D intensity, firms with $1-3
billion annual revenues average 3.6% R&D intensity, and firms with
greater than $3 billion annual revenues average 3.4% R&D intensity.
This is the sort of "weak" dependence of R&D intensity upon firm
size predicted by the agency cost model.
212. 1991 R&D Scoreboard, supra note 46. The 1991 edition reported on 890 firms with
sales of at least $45 million and R&D expenditures of at least $1 million or at least one percent
of sales. Id. at 107. Business Week obtains the data from the 10-K forms filed by the firms. Id.
213. In fact, there are data points in excess of 100%, though not shown on the plot. These
were biotechnology firms with low sales but a great deal of equity and large R&D budgets.
Additionally, the data for the extremely large firms (greater than $10 billion) was not plotted
since this tended to obscure the data at the low end. Firm R&D spending behavior does not
change very much between $10 billion and $100 billion, though it trends downward somewhat.
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FIGURE 1: Distribution of R&D Intensity of
890 Firms by Firm Size
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It is clear from Figure 1 that, for all firm sizes, there is a wide
variation of R&D intensities. To see how R&D intensity varied with
firm size, the 890 firms were divided into nine "slices" (consisting of
the smallest 100 firms, the next 100, etc., up to the largest 90 firms).
Figure 2 is a 3-dimensional histogram that graphically displays how
the R&D intensity varied in the nine "slices."
19941
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FIGURE 2: 3-Dimensional Distribution of R&D
Intensity of 890 Firms By Firm Size
V Largest 90 Firms
F 7th 100
5th 100
Firm Size
Some interesting information about firm size and R&D intensity
is revealed by Figure 2. First, notice that rather than cluster about the
mean R&D intensity (3.4% in 1991), firms at all sizes tend toward
either very low (less than one percent) or very high (greater than ten
percent) levels. This may be indicative of firms that have weak or
strong monitoring, respectively.2 14
Second, Figure 2 shows that the relative frequency of occurrence
of low R&D intensity increases significantly with increasing firm
size, while the relative frequency of high R&D intensity firms de-
214. Alternatively, of course, it may be driven by industry type. That is, industries tend
towards very high or very low R&D intensities.
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creases with increasing firm size. This behavior is consistent with the
agency cost model for R&D investment.
C. Corporate Restructuring and R&D Spending
A frequently articulated criticism of the intense merger and ac-
quisition activity of the 1980s was their supposedly adverse effect on
industrial investment in R&D.215 These critics blamed the "myopia"
of both investors and managers. The criticisms generally adopted
some variation of the following reasoning:
Myopic investors (primarily institutional investors) facilitate hos-
tile tender offers by standing ready to tender their shares to anyone
offering the slimmest of premia over the market price. These
tender offers, successful or not, result in corporate restructuring
that cause funds that would otherwise be invested in R&D to be
spent servicing debt.2 16 Acquiring firms spend their cash on acqui-
sitions (thus purchasing then known results of another firm's R&D
investment) rather than investing in an internal R&D program.2 17
The acquired firms are then treated as "cash cows," to service the
debt used to finance the acquisition.218 Even if a takeover attempt
is unsuccessful, the huge debts often taken on by targets can divert
funds from R&DD. 2 19 Finally, the mere prospect of a takeover can
215. See Corporate Restructuring and R4D: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Science,
Research and Technology of the House Comm. on Science, Space, and Technology, 101st Cong.,
1st Sess. 24 (1989) [hereinafter Corporate Restructuring] (statement of Nathan H. Hurt) ("One
of the greatest threats now facing the continued vitality of corporate innovation and technology
development and application is the ongoing process of restructuring within American industry
forced by hostile takeovers, both attempted and contemplated.").
216. See id. at 6 (statement of Julie Gorte). Gorte, a Senior Analyst at the Office of Tech-
nology Assessment, reported the results of interviews with R&D managers of 19 companies that
were involved in corporate restructuring. In some, R&D was decreased, in some it stayed about
the same, and in others it increased. "The thing that distinguishes these outcomes is debt. Merg-
ers and acquisitions that leave the company with high debt have'had negative effects on R&D
spending." Id. at 7. See also PoRTER, supra note 39, at 528-29 (noting that the high debt typi-
cally taken on as a result of restructuring, with proceeds paid to shareholders instead of invested
in the business, "leads to risk aversion and a slowing of true strategic innovation"); Ridden with
Debt, supra note 45 (quoting Erich Block, former director of the National Science Foundation
and Charles Larson, executive director of the Industrial Research Institute each of whom assert
that restructuring and corporate debt have had a serious impact on R&D spending).
217. Bronwyn H. Hall, The Effect of Takeover Activity on Corporate Research and Devel-
opment, in Com'oRATE TAKEOVERs: CAusFs AND CoNsF~urmcns, 69,70 (Alan J. Auerbach, ed.
1988).
218. Id. at 71. See also Corporate Takeovers, supra note 164, at 247 (statement of F.M.
Scherer) (noting that "[o]ne prominent species of short-run polices [utilized by managers to avert
takeovers] is the 'cash cow' strategy under which a business is starved of R&D, equipment
modernization, and advertising funds, and/or prices are set at high levels inviting competitor
inroads, leaving in the end a depleted, non-competitive shell").
219. Two often cited examples are T. Boone Pickens' and Sir James Goldsmith's unsuc-
cessful runs at Phillips Petroleum and Goodyear, respectively. Prior to Pickens' attempt to ac-
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curtail R&D spending, even before any buyer appears upon the
scene. This prospect can divert management's attention from the
long-term investments to short-term performance:220  "to stave off
hostile takeover attempts, corporate managers ... try to prop up
stock prices by increasing short-term earnings, even at the expense
of abandoning otherwise profitable long-term investmentprojects. ,,221
The view, described above, that corporate restructuring has a det-
rimental effect on R&D investment, is largely at odds with the agency
cost approach presented in this paper for two reasons. First, it has
been argued here that investors should not be and, in fact, are not
myopic. The market is perfectly capable of valuing and does value
long-term investment decisions by firms. Second, restructuring is typ-
ically believed to reduce, not increase, agency costs222 -in fact, this is
one of the reasons why purchasers are willing to pay a premium over
market price.223 Restructuring can decrease agency costs in acquired
and acquiring firms and unacquired targets because the increased debt
constrains the non-profit maximizing activities of managers224 and can
even constrain excessive risk-avoidance of managers. 2
quire Phillips, the firm operated "the leading American oil company research laboratory."
Ridden with Debt, supra note 45. Phillips borrowed billions of dollars to finance a defensive
stock repurchase plan. Id. As a result, scientific research was cut in half. Id. Similarly, Good-
year took on $4 billion in debt to fight off Goldsmith. Corporate Restructuring, supra note 215,
at 122 (statement of Nathan H. Hurt). In the immediate aftermath, the corporate R&D budget
was slashed from $350 million to $150 million. Id. Worse yet, the company adopted a policy to
discontinue any R&D program that would not show a payoff within 2 years. Id.
220. See Corporate Takeovers, supra note 164, at 367 (statement of Charles F. Rule) (ac-
knowledging that the argument is often made, though Rule himself disputes it).
221. SEC RmEORT, reprinted in Corporate Takeovers, supra note 164, at 383.
222. See EASERBROOK & FiscHaL, supra note 17, at 112-117, 171-74 (describing their
agency cost model of tender offers). Easterbrook & Fischel note that "the gains (if any) [from
successful tender offers] come from the subsequent changes in the corporate structure and opera-
tions." Id. at 163.
223. Reductions in agency costs are perhaps most often cited with respect to leveraged
buyouts, transactions that, as will be discussed infra, have been subject to particularly harsh
criticism for their R&D reducing effects. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Market Failure and the
Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717, 740 n.72 (1984)
("LBO's reduce agency costs, which may increase the value of the firm in the hands of its
shareholders"); Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A Re-
sponse to the Anti-Contractarians, 65 WASH. L. Rev. 1, 22 n.88 (1990) (noting a reduction-of-
agency-cost explanation for premia paid in LBOs); Ronald J. Gilson, Evaluating Dual Class
Common Stock The Relevance of Substitutes, 73 VA. L. REv. 807, 840 (1987) (noting that firms
undergo LBOs because of the presence of agency costs).
224. For example, former RJR Nabisco CEO Ross Johnson, concerned about the high debt
required by a contemplated LBO, responded: "I'm telling you, we're not going to start running a
pushcart operation here. I don't want a bunch of your [the LBO firm, e.g., the prospective new
"owners"] guys coming around saying we should have five jets instead of six, that sort of thing,"
BuRRows & HELYA, supra note 182, at 166.
225. See Butier & Ribstein, supra note 223, 22 (1990) ("A debt-heavy structure, on the
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The available data on the effect of corporate restructuring on
R&D investment is somewhat mixed, but the preponderance of the
evidence points to the conclusion that restructuring has not had the
adverse effect commonly attributed to such transactions.
Of course, there is no lack of anecdotal evidence of the adverse
effects of successful and unsuccessful takeovers such as those of Phil-
lips Petroleum and Goodyear.226 One of the few studies of large num-
bers of firms that has found an adverse relationship between corporate
restructuring and R&D investment was performed by the National Sci-
ence Foundation (NSF).227 The NSF studied the 200 firms with the
largest R&D budgets during the 1984-86 period.228  Thirty-three of
these firms merged into sixteen resulting firms and eight additional
firms were restructured through leveraged buy outs (LBOs) or stock
buy-backs.229  The twenty-four restructured firms reduced R&D
spending by a combined 8.3% in real terms between 1986 and 1987,
while the 176 non-restructured firms reported a 5.4% increase in R&D
spending during the same period.230
Although the NSF study offers grounds for concern, numerous
other investigations have concluded that corporate restructurings are
not accompanied by a reduction in R&D investment. For example,
Professor Bronwyn Hall, a University of California at Berkeley econo-
mist, compiled a database of 2519 publicly held United States manu-
facturing firms over the 1976-85 period, during which time some 600
firms were acquired. 3 1 Hall found "little evidence of a significant
other hand, may be in the equity holders' interests from a management-monitoring standpoint in
the sense that it constrains excess retention of earnings or excessive risk-avoidance by manag-
ers."); Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance and Takeovers,
76 AM. EcoN. REv. 323 (1986) (noting that debt bonds future payouts, thus forcing managers to
plan for long-term revenues).
226. See Ridden with Debt, supra note 45. See also Lowell W. Steele, Needed: New Para-
digms for R&D, Ras. TEcH. MANAGEMENT, July-Aug., 1991, at 13 (stating that the business
climate that emerged from the "feeding frenzy of mergers and acquisitions during the 1980s [is]
clearly inimical to R&D"); Robert R. Miller, Do Mergers and Acquisitions Hurt R&D?, Res.
TEcH. MANAGEMENT, May-June, 1990, at 11 (reporting on anecdotal evidence of takeovers
harming R&D spending).
227. See Corporate Restructuring, supra note 215, at 24. (statement of William L. Stewart)
(describing the NSF study). The NSF study has been subject to considerable criticism. See, e.g.,
Merrill S. Brenner, R&D Cut Before-Not After-Acquisition, Ras. TE CH. MANAGEMENT, May-
June 1990, at 15.
228. Id. These 200 firms accounted for 90% of the total private R&D spending during the
time period of the study. Id. at 25.
229. Id.
230. Id. The study is careful to note that some of the reduction in spending may represent
the elimination of duplication and inefficiency. Id. at 26. The study also notes thatthe data does
not permit an assessment of any long-term effects of mergers and acquisitions on company-
sponsored R&D activities. Id. at 32.
231. Hall, supra note 217, at 77.
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difference in the mean growth rates of R&D intensity between firms
involved in acquisitions and nonacquiring firms."" 2 In an update to
this study, Hall reported that "the average post-acquisition R&D inten-
sity [of firms] rose from 1.6% to 1.8% in the two years following the
acquisition;" the same rate of increase seen by non-acquisition
firms.233 Thus, Professor Hall concludes that "corporate restructuring
per se is not a risk to the industrial R&D process." '234 The Hall results
are consistent with most other studies that have been performed on
corporate restructuring and R&D.235
Although the Hall results appear to contradict the NSF study, the
two are actually measuring different phenomena. The NSF study
looked at the total level of R&D funding while Hall looked at R&D
intensity-R&D as a percentage of sales. Thus, a firm that became
smaller through restructuring and reduced its R&D budget proportion-
ately would show up as a decrease in R&D spending in the NSF study
and as unchanged in R&D intensity in the Hall study.236
A study by the Chief Economist of the SEC looked at the flip
side of the NSF and Hall studies-namely, what is the effect of R&D
investment on a firm's likelihood of being acquired.237 The myopic
argument supra postulated that managers reduce or minimize R&D
investments in an attempt to prop-up short-term profits and stock
prices and thus avoid acquisition. The SEC report suggests that such
behavior on the part of management is misguided. The study looked
at 217 firms that were targets of successful tender offers between 1981
and 1984.238 Of these, 160 firms reported no significant R&D ex-
penditures prior to the tender offer, suggesting that it is incorrect to
assume that large R&D expenditures make a company susceptible to
tender offers.239 Of the remaining 57 firms, R&D intensity was less
than one-half that of industry control groups (0.77% vs. 1.66%) in the
year immediately preceding the tender offer and about half in the three
preceding years (0.75% vs. 1.49%).2' This data strongly suggests
232. Id. at 83.
233. Corporate Restructuring, supra note 215, at 48 (statement of Bronwyn Hall).
234. Id. at 49.
235. See, e.g., Corporate Restructuring, supra note 215, at 52-57 (statement of William F.
Long). Long summarized the results of nine studies of the impact of restructuring or of LBOs on
R&D investment, including those of Hall and the NSF, and concluded that "[c]learly the average
finding, the typical finding.... is that there's no effect of mergers and acquisitions generally or
of leveraged buy-outs in particular on R&D performance." Id. at 53.
236. Professor Hall herself offered this explanation for the different results. See Corporate
Restructuring, supra note 215, at 44 (statement of Bronwyn Hall).
237. SEC REPoRT, reprinted in Corporate Takeovers, supra note 164, at 382.
238. Id. at 389-390.
239. Id. at 390.
240. Id.
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that R&D spending does not make a firm vulnerable to a takeover.
A recent study by Lisa Meulbroek, et al., provides some of the
best direct empirical evidence refuting the myopic market hypothe-
sis.24' Meulbroek examined the R&D spending of 203 firms that
adopted shark repellent242 measures between January 1977 and May
1985. Spending on R&D was compared for the year prior to and the
three years following the adoption of the shark repellent measures.
The myopic market theory would predict that R&D intensity would
increase following the adoption of shark repellent measures, as man-
agers are freed from the threat of hostile takeovers and able to focus
on longer-term investments.243
Contrary to the results predicted by the myopic market model,
Meulbroek found that, after adjusting for market-wide and industry-
wide increases in R&D spending, R&D intensity decreased signifi-
cantly following a firm's implementation of a shark repellent.244 For
example, as compared to the year prior to the implementation of a
shark repellent, market adjusted R&D intensity decreased by a statisti-
cally significant cumulative 15.42, 25.29, and 37.25% in the first year,
first two years, and first three years following the adoption of a shark
repellent, respectively.245 The industry-adjusted numbers were 5.99,
11.46, and 12.04%, all statistically significant.246 Meulbroek and her
colleagues speculate that the decrease in R&D spending following the
implementation of anti-takeover measurements might be explained by
entrenched management, freed from the discipline of the market for
corporate control, acting in its own self-interest rather than the long-
term interests of the firm and its shareholders.' 7
241. Meulbroek et al., supra note 13.
242. Shark repellents are provisions in a firm's charter or bylaws that are intended to delay
or discourage unsolicited takeover bids. See David S. Freeman, Shark Repellent Charter and
Bylaw Provisions, 16 J. Cop. L. 491, 494 (1991).
243. Meulbroek et al., supra note 13, at 1116.
244. Id. at 1111-16.
245. Id. at 1114.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 1116. These results and interpretations are consistent with earlier studies report-
ing that anti-takeover measures by firms and legislatures reduce shareholder wealth. See Jeffrey
Netter, Ending the Interest Deductibility of Debt Used to Finance Takeovers is Still a Bad Idea:
The Empirical Evidence on Takeovers, Restrictions on Takeovers, and Restrictions on Deduct-
ibility ofInterest, 15 J. CoRu. L. 219, 227-42 (1990); Gregg A. Jarrell & Annette B. Poulsen,
Shark Repellents and Stock Prices: The Effects of Anti-takeover Amendments Since 1980, 19 J.
FiN. EcoN. 127 (1987); Harry DeAngelo & Edward M. Rice, Antitakeover Charter Amendments
and Stockholder Wealth, 11 J. Fmn. EcoN. 329 (1983); Bradley William Kragel, Note, Fear of the
Hostile Takeover: Having Tamed and Reined the Beasts, State Regulation Would Kill Them as
Well, 14 J. Coiu. L. 133, 137-42 (1988) and sources cited therein.
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CONCLUSION
There is wide agreement that American industry underinvests in
R&D. Many commentators blame this underinvestment on "myopic"
investors who are interested in short-term profits at the expense of
long-term investment and who force managers to adopt short-term
strategies. This article has disputed the myopic investor explanation,
both theoretically and empirically, and suggested in its place an
agency cost model in which investors favor long-term investment in
R&D but managers, in their own self-interest, maximize short-term
profits and sacrifice risky, long-term R&D investments.
The focus of this article has been on describing and explaining
the problem of corporate underinvestment in R&D, rather than in pro-
posing solutions. However, the model one chooses to describe the
problem has important public policy implications. The myopic market
model suggests adoption of strong anti-takeover legislation, for exam-
ple, while the agency cost model would reject such measures and en-
courage a vigorous market for corporate control. This debate over
corporate restructuring and R&D spending has been presented above,
and the data strongly suggest that the agency cost model provides the
better explanation for the available data. Similar implications are in-
volved for such questions as tax policy, 248 patent policy,249 executive
compensation, 5 0 and even insider trading.251
248. See generally, William Natbony, The Tax Incentives for Research and Development:
An Analysis and a Proposal, 76 GEo. L. J. 347 (1987) (discussing the policy rationales behind,
and the mechanics of, the provisions in the Tax Code for encouraging R&D investment).
249. See, e.g., Rafael X. Zahralddin, Note, The Effect of Broad Patent Scope on the Com-
petitiveness of United States Industry, 17 DEz.. J. CoP. L. 949, 977-83 (1992) (adopting the
myopic market model).
250. See supra notes 77-83 and accompanying text.
251. Some commentators have long argued that restrictions on insider trading can increase
agency costs. See, e.g., HENRY G. MANN , INSIDER TRADinO AND Tma SToCK MARKr (1966);
Carlton & Fischel, supra note 99; Henry G. Manne, In Defense of Insider Trading, HARv. Bus.
REv. Nov.-Dec. 1966, at 113. For a contrary view, see, e.g., Roy A. Schotland, Unsafe at Any
Price: A Reply to Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock Market, 53 VA. L. REv. 1425 (1967).
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